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The Paramaterial Phantasy

The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm, and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy. Part One.

This entry is part [part not set] of 2 in the series The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm, and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy.

The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy

Part I. The Three Fleshly Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy

Augustine famously discusses the three eyes of a perceiver. He details that, first, there is the eye of the flesh. Second, there is the eye of the spirit. And third, there is an eye of the intellect. All three eyes converge and interact to constitute sensation and perception’s interrelation with thought. The fleshly, bodily, and corporeal eye, consisting of the bodily organ, experiences the physical vision of things present before it. The spiritual eye, consisting of the faculty of the mind responsible for internal vision, mentally imagines or reconstructs things not immediately present before the corporeal eye. The intellectual eye, consisting of the Christian as well as spiritual soul, attends to knowledge acquired by the other eyes and also to spiritual matters and God. While all three of Augustine’s eyes have a bearing on early modern understandings of vision, for this post, I will focus on three very different eyes in early modern optical anatomy.[i]

The three eyes that I will discuss in this essay are all bodily eyes. Representations of the bodily eye, responsible for sensation and, in many theories, for perception, underwent a major shift during the course of the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth. The changes in ocular anatomy from 1543 to 1619 occurred at an alarming rate as anatomists turned their eyes from classical authorities and dissected non-human animal eyes to the eyes of the human animal. It is possible to debate the elite science’s sphere of influence upon popular beliefs and cultural practices, and while new theories of vision and models from optical anatomy took a long time to establish themselves in scientific and popular thought, it is my contention that they led to fundamentally different theories of a perceiver’s relationship with the world and to themselves. The eye, like the heavens to which it was often compared, became a conflicted space that underwent a radical theoretical reorientation and reconfiguration by the early seventeenth century.

In a period when natural philosophers found reflections of the divine ordering and structure of the universe, the macrocosm, in the body, the microcosm, and even in its parts, the conceptual framework often depended upon analogical and anagogical thinking that read similarity as a bearer of genuine connection. Astronomers and anatomists challenged the traditional ordering of both the macrocosm and the microcosm of the eye from the mid-sixteenth century and developed new models by the early seventeenth.

The German polymath, Johannes Kepler, played a key role in the revolutions in both the macrocosm and the microcosm. Perhaps most famous for his contributions to astronomy when he defended and elaborated upon Nicholas Copernicus’ hypothesis that the universe revolved, not around the earth, but rather around the sun, Kepler made important contributions to theoretically reorganizing the structure of the cosmos, and his work helped replace a Ptolemaic geocentric model of the universe with a Copernican heliocentric one.

At the level of the microcosm, Kepler made another important contribution to yet another revolution. Arguably the most important development of early modern physiology, his 1604 Astronomiae Pars Optica argued that the bodily eye’s lens focuses light and projects it onto the retinal screen at the back of the eye. The problem for Kepler and for theorists of vision and optics for some time following was that if the lens focuses the visual field and projects it upon the retina, the image within the eye would be inverted with respect to vertical orientation and flipped with respect to horizontal orientation. 

The importance of this revolution in the microcosm should not be understated. A. C. Crombie argues that Kepler’s discovery of the eyes’ function constitutes an achievement that rivals, if not surpasses, William Harvey’s discovery that the heart operates as a pump that circulated blood. Crombie argues that a theory of “mechanization” of the body preceded Harvey’s discovery and that this “mechanized” view of the body helped lead to Kepler’s revolution in optical anatomy.

Historian of vision, David C. Lindberg, challenges Crombie’s argument that Kepler was a revolutionary figure. Lindberg ultimately concludes that Kepler represents “the culminating figure in the perspectivist tradition,” “strenuously object[ing] to Crombie’s and Straker’s attempt to view him as a revolutionary figure who transformed visual theory by ‘mechanizing’ it” (Lindberg 207). While Lindberg objects to Crombie’s arguments, I do think Kepler’s theory of vision was revolutionary at its core. To me, the very idea of postulating an eye that did not see either as the visual field before it or as the mind perceived it was a revolutionary move that had the effect of turning the world upside down with respect to the eye. In order to understand the groundbreaking nature of Kepler’s revolution with respect to ocular anatomy, I will use this essay to explore the representations of ocular anatomy and the eye’s functioning preceding and immediately following Kepler’s.

Oddly enough, although cultural and literary critics and historians have extensively studied vision from the late medieval and early modern periods, no one, to my knowledge, yet theorizes the importance of the very profound differences between pre-modern and modern optical anatomy and the theories of vision to which they are bound. In pointing out this oversight, I am not only referring to critics who anachronistically refer to the retinal image in their discussions of pre-seventeenth-century literature and culture, but also to critics who discuss philosophical skepticism or the early modern sensorium without acknowledging the importance of the way contemporary theories of the senses and vision underwent profound changes in the early modern period.[ii]

Historians of science and historians of the senses, on the other hand, cover some of this ground, but their methods often promote and trace narratives of scientific progress that, in my opinion, have two major shortcomings when viewed from the perspective of a cultural and literary critic. The first shortcoming is that these histories of science often deploy a top-down approach that rarely turns to popular culture to explore how scientific developments and thoughts shape and are shaped by broader historical and cultural concerns and shifts. The second is that the focus on scientific progress leads to blind spots in their field of vision when they only study the major figures without attending to how popular and vernacular works describe the same processes.

Take Lindberg’s discussion of the retinal image, for example. In his discussion of Leonardo da Vinci’s unpublished journals that grapple with the notion of the possible inversion of the image within the eye, Lindberg says with subtle sarcasm, “one of Leonardo’s major preoccupations was with the actual path of rays through the eye. His chief concern was to get the rays to the visual power at the end of the optic nerve without inversion, for he must by all means guard against that absurdity” (Lindberg 166). The lengths to which Leonardo goes to try to right the inverted image makes perfect sense when you consider that proposing an inverted image within the eye would be an unthinkable absurdity. For most of human history, the image within the eye was thought to necessarily conform to the visual field before it and to the way in which it was perceived by the mind.

While Lindberg proves a valuable resource for the study of the history of theories of vision, and while he places our understanding of Kepler’s contributions within the framework of a long history of optics, situating him as tied to the medieval tradition, his work is also directed towards exposing the paths that lead to major discoveries rather than exploring the terrain of how such theories and discoveries shape and are shaped by popular culture. My hope is that by exploring those elite discourses alongside popular discourses, we can come to a better understanding about how vision and our sense of “seeing” is itself culturally contingent and shaped through discourse.

Perhaps the best recent work on early modern vision, the eye’s relationship to the inner senses, and the changes happening in both elite and popular discourses on the eye is Stuart Clark’s fascinating book, Vanities of the Eye. In conjunction with his earlier Thinking with Demons, Clark provides invaluable insight into early modern theories of perception and cognition that straddle the boundaries between elite and popular discourses, and between intellectual histories of vision and cultural criticism. In Vanities, Clark argues that vision was “derationalized” over the course of the seventeenth century, challenging the notion that understandings of the eye became more scientific and rational. Even Clark, though, does not really address the profound changes in optical anatomy from roughly the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries. It is my contention that the process of de-centering the power within the eye contributes to the process of “derationalizing” premodern conceptions of the eye and orders of vision.

This essay will address the potential revolutionary changes in optical anatomy from 1543 to 1619 in two parts. The first half of this essay maps the terrain of early modern optical anatomy. In this part, I argue that the early modern period had three different stages and models of the eye’s structure. The three early modern eyes I detail in this part trace the de-centering movement of the crystalline humor in theories of vision from its early placement at the very center of the eye to its position towards the front of the eye.

The second half of this essay details the associations established between the microcosm of the eye and the macrocosm. In this part, I argue that the developments I discuss in part one relate to changes in theories of the macrocosm. By exploring vernacular discussions of the crystalline humor and its position within the bodily eye, I show how those symbolic resemblances and correspondences in its de-centering prefigure and reflect the reconfiguration of the cosmos.

As I discuss briefly in a previous post, prior to Kepler and the ultimate acceptance of his theory of ocular anatomy, the lens itself did not focus and project light upon the rear surface of the eye, but, instead, was thought to be the “seat of vision.” This seat of vision, called the “crystalline humor,” received the impressions or species of external objects, transferring them, no matter if vision acquired those impressions through extramission or intromission[iii], to the inner senses. While I have discussed those “impressions,” the objects of sensation and perception, and the internal senses before and most likely will again, for now I want to focus on the ways in which the material organ itself underwent a broad historical shift from the mid-sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century.

The crystalline humor was thought of as the seat of vision. Its important position with respect to vision depended not only upon its function, but also upon its physical location within the organ of sight. At the center of a sphere, the crystalline humor occupied not only a central position within explanations of its function but also a central position within the physical eye itself. Early optical anatomies and theories of sight seemingly depended upon the notion that a physically central component reflected and manifested its nobility and centrality to functioning. Many early optical anatomies distorted the position and shape of the crystalline humor within the eye to make it conform more to the idea that it was the most important component of the eye. As with contemporary theories the macrocosm, the physically central position bore symbolic and real significance. Just as the earth stood at the center of the cosmos, the crystalline humor stood at the center of the eye.

The Galenic Eye and Vesalius

I will turn first to the model of the eye I will refer to as the “Galenic eye.” While its representation has the longest history, my visual example comes from the first widely printed work of early modern anatomy, Andreas Vesalius’ monumental De Humani Corporis Fabrica of 1543.

The eye as Vesalius represents it in his De Fabrica. This image from a Venetian 1568 edition, page 495.

The eye as Vesalius represents it in his De Fabrica. This image from a Venetian 1568 edition, page 495.

In Vesalius’ figure, we see the crystalline humor positioned at the exact center of the oracular orb. The shape, too, appears more spherical than it should when compared to the images of optical anatomy from a modern anatomy book, and I will compare this Galenic eye to the modern eye later in this post. First, however, I want to attend to Vesalius’ representation and its subsequent critics.

Vesalius famously took issue with anatomies that were based in the repetition of ancient authorities and upon the dissection of non-human animals instead of upon direct observation of human bodies. Despite his corrective to many classically based misunderstandings of human anatomy, Vesalius errs in his representation of the eye, conforming to a model of optical anatomy that placed the crystalline humor almost in the center of the eye.[iv] While the crystalline humor he positions at the eye’s center is not perfectly spherical, in previous and in many later descriptions of the crystalline humor, natural philosophers often referred to it as a sphere. While not perfectly spherical in the image above, many texts continued to describe the central position and spherical shape of the crystalline humor as evidence of its nobility and its central role in the process of vision well past criticisms of such representations.

In the first widely printed work of modern anatomy, Vesalius followed classical authority in placing what had long been considered the seat of vision directly at the center of the eye. The whole of ocular anatomy’s description of the eye placed the eye’s other parts in relation to the crystalline humor. Vesalius, and many other optical theorists and anatomists, emphasized the importance of the crystalline humor. It was not only physically positioned at the very center of the eye, but also the whole of the eye served its centralized power. The fluids which filled the eye provided the crystalline with “nutrition,” the eye’s coats and its spherical shape were designed to protect and enclose it, and the colors on the inside surface of the eye “refreshed” it. It would seem that the crystalline humor’s unassailable centrality to the eye’s function demanded that it remain physically as well as symbolically central to the organ of sight.         

The figure in De Fabrica maintains the eye’s integrity and analogical link to the cosmos by placing the crystalline at the eye’s very center.  Like the earth at the center of the geocentric universe, the crystalline humor maintained its importance by that centrality[v]. The crystalline humor, analogically, and, often, anagogically, related to its object, the world itself, received likenesses of that world in the form of visual objects. 

Despite his placement of the crystalline humor, Vesalius made at least one important contribution with respect to ocular anatomy. The optic nerve, previously widely reported as hollow, turned out not to be hollow at all. Although the notion of the optic nerve as a conduit for vital spirits to transfer to and from the eye and the internal senses or wits persisted in dominant theories of visual perception, the change might have challenged the understanding that spirits carried the species or images into the inner recourses of the brain.[vi]

The Mediate Early Modern Eye

Vesalius’ distortion of ocular anatomy, however, did not go unrecognized for too long after the publication of his book. It was Vesalius’ possible successor at Padua and eventual rival, Realdo Colombo, who corrected Vesalius’ optical anatomy, pointing out and partially amending Vesalius’ error in Colombo’s only publication, the De Re Anatomica, published in 1559. Colombo claims that, like many of the errors Vesalius corrected based on classical anatomists’ dissection of animal bodies, Vesalius’ error derived from the anatomy of large animal eyes, most likely bovine, instead of human eyes. As Colombo puts it,

At aliorum animalium oculi non sunt undique orbiculares, sed vel oblique, vel depressi: neque id mirum est, cum hominis figura tanto interuallo a reliquis distet animantibus. Scito praeterea neminem ante me hominis oculum descripsisse, sed omnes beluinum oculum descripsere, magno & turpi errore, in quem ipse quoque Vesalius incidit, in eius universa pene formatione cum aliis Anatomicis deceptus. Quod verum, esse facile perspicies,si Galeni,vesalii, aliorumque Anatomicorum historiam de oculo cum nostra contuleris. & profecto non leviter hi homines accusandi sunt, Galenus praefertim,& post ipsum Vesalius, qui tantam rem, tam illustrem, tam optatam, tam negligenter scribendam putarent, beluinum oculum pro humano dissecates. (397).

[But the eyes in other animals are not perfectly orbicular, but are either oblique or depressed: it is not difficult to tell the difference of human eyes from the eyes of beasts. Know that no one else before me describes the human eye, but instead described the eye of a beast, and this is the great basis of Vesalius’ error. Vesalius fell into deception with the others of his training in Anatomy. That this is true, it is easy to see clearly, if Galen, Vesalius, and others compare their history of the anatomy of the eye to mine. Many prefer Galen [before] and Vesalius after him that they accept such a thing, so illustrious, so longed for, to be negligently written, taking a dissected beast’s eye for a human eye.][vii]

Colombo goes on to note other errors in Vesalius’ anatomy of the human eye, saying later,

Erroresque Vesalii in historia de oculo nullo negocio deprehendes … nam non modo in musculis & membranis, sed in humoribus quoque decipitur, & tota errat via, existimans cristallinum humorem in centro oculi exquisite situm esse. (405).

[Errors in Vesalius’ history of the eye are not difficult to find … for he is deceived not only in the muscles and membranes, but also in the humors, and he completely errs [in positioning] the crystalline humor in the eye’s center.]

Detailing Vesalius’ errors, Colombo notes that Vesalius’ most grievous concerns the placement of the crystalline humor at the very center of the eye.

While criticizing Vesalius for distorting human optical anatomy through animal dissection rather than human dissection, Colombo distorts the eye in his own way.  He maintains a largely spherical eye, and while he moves the crystalline humor towards the front of the organ, he does not place it just behind the pupil at the front of the eye. But despite not placing the crystalline where modern anatomists situate the lens and while maintaining its centrality in the perceptual process, Colombo de-centers the crystalline humor within the organ.[viii] Even once Colombo’s de-centered crystalline humor became the norm, popular anatomies continued to stress the importance of its centrality to the eye as well as the importance of its and the eye’s spherical shape.

Colombo’s observations led to a new model in early modern optical anatomy which I will refer to as the “mediate early modern eye.” My second image comes from the tables attached to the 1583 edition of Felix Platter’s De Corporis Humani Structura Et Usu.

The Mediate Eye represented in Platter's 1583 De Corporis. Table 49.

The Mediate Eye represented in Platter’s 1583 De Corporis. Table 49.

Felix Platter, who challenged theories of vision that argued the crystalline humor was the vision’s seat as early as 1583, follows Colombo in positioning the crystalline humor more towards the front of the eye. Platter was the first to argue that the crystalline humor was not the seat of vision, arguing instead for the primacy of the optic nerve and the retinal image. Kepler probably drew upon Platter’s description, but Platter did not, at least not in his text, discuss the inversion of the retinal image.  I will return to Platter’s contributions to the retinal image below, but, for now want to discuss the representations of the mediate early modern eye like his which were the most popular representations of optical anatomy from the mid-sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries.

What follows is a series of what I am calling the mediate early modern eye taken from popular vernacular anatomies printed in English from the sixteenth and early seventeenth century.

The mediate eye from the 1634 English translation of Pare. Page 185.
The mediate eye in Crooke’s 1615 Mikrokosmographia (Microcosmographia). Distorted in this scan. Page 555.

 

 

 

By far the most popular image of ocular anatomy, the mediate early modern eye persisted in various forms and copies. Most of the above examples represent copies or close approximations of one another, but George Bartisch’s 1583 German work on ophthalmology, Opthalmodouleia Das ist Augendienst, contains a flap anatomy of a very similar construction of the eye.

The mediate eye as represented in Bartisch in 1583. Here emptied of its other humors. Flap anatomy between pages 8 and 9.
The mediate eye as represented in Bartisch in 1583. Here depicting its other humors. Flap anatomy between pages 8 and 9.

 

 

 

Bartisch’s figure shows a perfectly spherical eye, but also includes flaps that show the mediate positioning of the crystalline humor as well as by the aqueous humor before it and the vitreous humor behind it.

This mediate early modern eye is by far the most common in early modern anatomies from the late sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth. Not quite placed in its modern position just behind the pupil, but no longer positioned directly in the center of the eye, anatomists positioned the crystalline humor there for quite some time. What remains peculiar is that although most late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century anatomy books include representations of this mediate early modern eye, their descriptions often draw upon the Galenic eye even when they correct the errors found in the descriptions and representations of the eye like those found in Galen and Vesalius.

Even the printed version of Kepler’s manuscript conforms to the model established by this mediate early modern eye.

While not in Kepler's manuscript, the printed version included this image of the mediate eye.

While not in Kepler’s manuscript, the printed version included this image of the mediate eye.

While Kepler himself did not provide an illustration in his manuscript, this published text did include an image that resembles the ones I posted above. I will return later in this post and in subsequent posts to the importance of Kepler’s discovery of the retinal image, but it is important to note that the figure appearing in his 1604 Ad Vitellionem paralipomena Quibus Astronomiae pars optica traditur contains the image of the mediate early modern eye.

Despite the mediate early modern eye appearing in the printed version of his Paralipomena Kepler famously challenged the primacy of the crystalline humor, arguing instead for the importance of the retina and the retinal image. As he puts it,

Visionem fieri dico, cum totius hemisphaerii mundani, quod est ante oculum, & amplius paulo, idolum statuitur ad album subrufum retinae cauae superficiei parietam. (Kepler 168)

[I say vision is accomplished, when the whole hemisphere of the world and a bit more which is before the eye, an idolum is placed on the curved, reddish-white retinal wall.]

Unseating the crystalline humor’s primacy within the eye and in the process of vision, Kepler offers the retinal image in its stead. Before I discuss Kepler more extensively, however, I would like to turn to some early modern textual descriptions of the eye as they embody the tensions between the representations of the Galenic eye and the mediate early modern eye.

Even in texts which represent the mediate early modern eye, the verbal descriptions often draw upon the Galenic eye for the significance of the organ of sight. Despite acknowledging that the crystalline humor was not at the center of the eye or in the shape of a perfect sphere, later anatomical treatises often laud it for its centrality and spherical shape. In his 1578 The Historie of Man, John Banister does the same while simultaneously registering Colombo’ corrective contribution to ocular anatomy when he describes the crystalline humor as follows:

The second humor of the eye is Christalloides; or Christallinus, called so, for because it shineth like light, and in pure clearenes comparable to the christall. The place where it is sited is towardes the forepartes, almost in the centre of the eye, beyng amplected olf the hinder part with the vitrious humor, hauyng no other Membran interiacent or lyeng betwene: but before couered with Aranea. The figure of the christalline humor is round, but in the fore part depressed: where it respecteth the watrish humor, it is lyke the kynde of a pulse called a lentill. The substaunce, of this humor is somewhat hard. The vse therof is exiellent & most noble: beyng almost the principall member of sight, pleasaunt to be marked, and worthy to be knowen, not iniuriously therfore called the idole, or Image of seeing. (Banister 102).

In Banister’s description of the eye, we see that he has corrected his optical anatomy in accordance with Colombo’s observations, but he also partly conforms to the notion that the crystalline humor lies more central to the eye and that it has a round shape though depressed on the forepart. Banister does acknowledge that the chrystalline humor only “almost” sits in the center of the eye, and notes that the lens is round but is “in the fore part depressed,” but the legacy built up around the crystalline humor’s centrality to the organ of sight remains strong in Banister’s description. Banister notes that the crystalline humor is “excellent & most noble” partly based on the notion that its centrality confirmed the nobility both of the humor and of vision in general.

Banister even refers directly to Colombo’s critique of Vesalius, translating Colombo’s attack almost verbatim. He says,

The fashion of the eyes in man is rounde: which if you marke well, you shall finde that nothyng elles in the body hath a direct rounde proportion. But in other creatures the eyes are not directly round, no, rather oblique or depressed. Neither is that marueilous, whilest the figure of man differeth from all other creatures in no small poynt. Neither more openly, then worthely, hath Realdus Collumbus reproued such as hitherto haue made description of the eyes, by frequentation of brutish Anathomies: which clearely he noteth in Galen, and after him Vesalius, whose skilfulnes in matters Anathomicall no man neglecteth: yet with no small negligence is he spotted in this point, since, so carelesly to write in a matter so great, excellent, and oft wished he blushed not. (Banister 102).

Again, Banister notes the spherical shape of the eye, going further to suggest that no other part of the body comes as close to the shape of a perfect sphere. It was the perfectly spherical shape and the crystalline humor’s centrality within it that reinforced and confirmed the eye’s connection to the macrocosm’s ordering of the heavenly spheres.

Similar to the English Banister, the same tension appears in popular works on the eye translated into English towards the end of the sixteenth century. The French physician Jacques Guillemeau, in the English translation of his One Hundred Thirteen Diseases of the Eye, describes the crystalline humor as follows:

His seat is in the middest between the waterish and glassie humor, not onlie ministring nourishment and moisture, and so preserving from drinesse, but also to helpe and preserve the same, and to moderate & appease the rage of spirites and colours, which might hurte it. The fashion of it is rounde, whiche more easily resisteth outward injuries: for this figure is hardlie hurt, because it hath no corners. It is true that the roundnesse of it is somewhat pressed and pinched before and behind, but so that therby it remaineth more sure and stedfast in the place, whiche was harde to bee done in a round figure. (Guillemeau Chapter 4).

Guillemeau does not include any illustrations, but his description appears to place the crystalline directly in the center of the eye like the Galenic eye. Even if Guillemeau is referring to the mediate early modern eye, his verbal description could give a potential reader the impression that the eye was arranged in accordance with the Galenic model. He, too, notes the centrality of the crystalline humor, providing an explanation as to why the seat of vision is not perfectly spherical.

Nearly every other work published in English on the anatomy of the eye I have found from the late sixteenth century into the early seventeenth century, when they include images, represent the mediate early modern eye, and, when they describe optical anatomy, describe the crystalline humor as the eye’s primary part, but also note its centric, or nearly centric, position within the orb of the eye. This includes works by Englishmen like John Banister, Helkiah Crooke and popular works translated from French into English like Pierre La Pimaudaye’s The French Academie, André du Laurens’ A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholike diseases; of Rheums, and of Old Age, Jacques Guillemeau’s A Worthy Treatise of the Eyes, and Ambroise Paré’s Workes among others.

The crystalline humor’s centrality to a spherical eye trailed clouds of significance. I will return to some of those elements below when I discuss the treatment of the eye as a microcosm, but here want to discuss one description that casts the crystalline humor’s position in heroic terms. In 1594, French physician André du Laurens first published his Discours de la conservation de la veue: des maladies meloncholiques des catarrhes, which the English Richard Surphlet soon translated. With good reason, I quote the beautiful 1599 Surphlet translation at length:

Loe thus all vailes, shadowes and covert being taken away, it is now time to make a plaine and open shew of the most precious jewell of the eye, that rich diamond, that beautiful christall, which is of more worth than all the pearles of the East. This is that icelike humour, which is the principall instrument of the sight, the soule of the eye, the inward spectacle: this is that humour which alone is altered by colours, & receiveth whatsoever formes the things that are to be seene. This is that chirstalline humour, which in more hardie wise then Hercules, dares to encounter two at once, namely, the outward and the inward light. This is that onely christalline humour, which all the other parts of the eye acknowledge their sovereigne, and themselves the vassals thereof: for the hornie tunicle doth the office of a glasse unto it: the apple, the office of a window: the grapelike coate is as a fayre flowering garden, to cheare and rejoyce the same after wearisome labout: the cobweblike coate serveth as lead to retaine such formes as are offered: the waterish humour as a warlike foreward, to intercept and breake off the first charge of the objects thereof, assaying all upon the sudden, and with headlong violence to make breach and entrance: The vitreous humour is his cooke, dressing and setting forth in most fit sort his daily repast: The nerve opticke, one of his ordinary messengers, carrying from the braine thereto, commandment and power to see, and conveying backe againe with all speede whatsoever hath been seene: The muscles are his loftie steedes and couragious courses, whereup being mounted it advanceth it selfe aloft, casteth it selfe alow, turneth it selfe on the right and left hand: and finally in every such sort, as seemeth best unto it selfe. In briefe, this is the principall part of the eye, which I intend to describe… (Du Laurens 34).

Du Laurens positions the crystalline humor, which he later states is “placed in the middest of the eye, as in his center, to the end it may equally and indifferently intertaine and admit of both the lights” (34), as a Herculean hero and sovereign of the eye. The whole of optical anatomy serves the crystalline humor as its master, and that master engages in a mythological epic battle between two different assailants, the outward and inner lights.

The centrality of the crystalline humor to the eye reaches a metaphorical apex in du Laurens’ description, and his wonderful elaboration also exposes how the crystalline humor was seen as a type of sovereign as well as how the physical arrangement of the space within the eye could take on analogical and significance. The physical centrality and the functional centrality of the crystalline humor are intertwined not only in du Laurens’ elaborate metaphorical riffing but also in the anatomical descriptions of the eye itself. The sovereign of the eye must be spherical and central to its kingdom. Kepler would play an important role in de-centering its power further and culminating in its regicide. Before that time, however, the crystalline humor, as in du Laurens’ description, ruled the eye from a centralized seat of visual power.

I will return to the significance of metaphors du Laurens deploys below, but, before I do, I first want to discuss the final early modern eye or, simply, the modern eye. It was not until 1619 with the publication of Jesuit Christoph Scheiner’s Oculus hoc est: Fundamentum opticum that an anatomically “correct” image of the eye was printed.

The modern eye from Scheiner in 1619. Page 17.

The modern eye from Scheiner in 1619. Page 17.

This crude figure of the eye more closely resembles the eye of modern anatomy.[ix] Here, we see an eye that is not a perfect sphere with a lens that is no longer close to being central to the organ. Clearly towards the forepart of the eye, the lens nestles just behind the pupil, focusing and reflecting light on the curved surface of the retina at the rear of the eye. As I mentioned above, even Kepler’s work contains an image of the eye that differs dramatically from modern representations.

Scheiner’s work on optics verified Platter’s and Kepler’s earlier contentions that the retina rather than the crystalline humor was the central component of the eye.[x] Not only did the retinal image now dominate optical theory, but also completed the de-centering and dethroning of the eye’s previous seat of power, the crystalline humor. From this point forward, in elite science at least, the formerly mighty crystalline humor was relegated to a subservient role with respect to the retina and its retinal image.  

One can see this modern representation of ocular anatomy in my final visual example which comes from René Descartes’ text, probably the single most recognizable image of early modern optical anatomy. In this image, we find an eye must closer to the ones we find in a modern anatomy book. Not only is the lens placed much closer to the forepart of the eye, but the eye itself is no longer represented as perfectly spherical.

The modern eye depicted as a camera obscura in Descartes.

The modern eye depicted as a camera obscura in Descartes.

I will return to Descartes’ conception of vision and the importance of this figure in the second half of this essay, but his representation stands as a good example of what I will call the “modern eye,” despite the fact that it still differs in some aspects from what we think of when we turn to contemporary books of human anatomy. Descartes not only compared the human eye to a camera obscura, but also claimed the eye worked in the exact same way as the device and effectively was a camera obscura.

Descartes, like Kepler before him, accepted the retinal image and its inversion. Unlike Kepler, Descartes did not stop his investigation at the retinal image, theorizing the image from the eye at least as far as the pineal gland, and explaining that “it is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but only by means of the brain” (Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings 68). The retinal image contributed in no small degree to Descartes’ philosophical skepticism. The disconnect established between sensation within the eye and perception in the soul dismantled theories that expressed their relationship and connection. While Descartes borrows many of his skeptical arguments from prior skeptical models, it is the retinal image that creates slightly different epistemological horizons for philosophical skepticism.[xi]

I do not mean to suggest that either Kepler or Descartes were singular geniuses that emerged from historical vacuums. Kepler continued to promote a quasi-Aristotelian understanding of the sensitive soul and Descartes not only adapted earlier skeptical motifs but also reiterated the quasi-Aristotelian model of the sensitive soul even if he pushed it beyond the pineal gland. Both figures shaped and were shaped by theories of perception available at the time of their writing.

The three corporeal eyes I discuss in the first half of this essay present the range of ocular anatomy from before 1543 to 1619, and I have shown the predominance of the mediate early modern eye in this period. Lindberg wonders what took so optical theories and ocular anatomists so long in coming to the realization that the crystalline humor functioned as a lens that projected light upon the retina when the relevant geometry and understanding of lenses were present for a long time previously. Part of the reason it took so long to discover the retinal image and correctly represent ocular anatomy has to do with the “absurdity” of claiming that the image within the eye was upside down and horizontally flipped.

In the next section, I explore the analogical and anagogical relationships developed in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century popular vernacular discourses that help explain what made de-centering the eye’s seat of power difficult and potentially revolutionary. These cultural beliefs, I suspect, made recognizing the correct position and function of the crystalline humor so difficult even beyond the absurdity of the retinal image and its inversion.

Broader cultural beliefs and practices shape early modern discourses on vision. The very notion that the eye must contain a species or image that conforms to the visual plane before it or as it is perceived in the mind was the biggest obstacle for early modern theorists of optics to overcome, but other discourses shaped their own perception of the eye. One wonders, for example, why Colombo and those who represented the mediate early modern eye not only emphasized a perfectly spherical shape to the human organ of vision and why, even when de-centering the position of the crystalline humor, they continued to place it, not towards the forepart of the eye, but more towards its center.

One explanation is that when early modern anatomists looked at the eye’s interior, they saw a radically different eye than modern anatomists. They saw within it a microcosm of the macrocosm. They saw an organ whose central functional component should occupy the organ’s physical center, and whose other parts were arranged in relation to and served this “sovereign” within the eye. The legacy of discourses that proclaimed the crystalline humor’s superiority and sovereignty shaped their own perception of the anatomized human eye. Even when they recognized, following the period of Vesalius, that the crystalline humor was not in the exact center of the orb of the eye, cultural discourses shaped their thought and perception in such a way as to construct the mediate early modern eye.

The anatomists’ shaping of sense also influenced and affected the recognition of the retinal image and its inversion. Not only did they see the crystalline humor as the eye’s seat of vision, but it was also imperative that the image within the eye conform to the orientation of the visual field and the way in which the mind perceived that visual field, and such an a priori stance obstructed the retinal image and its inversion’s acceptance. Even though many theorists of optics were probably aware of the camera obscura, they did not directly argue that the eye worked exactly like a camera obscura until much later since it was known that the camera obscura projected an inverted image upon a screen placed behind it. In the next section, I will go on to discuss the retinal image and inversion as well as the ways popular vernacular discourses published in or translated into English shaped and were shaped by ocular anatomy.

Works Cited

Banister, John. The Historie of Man. London 1578. (The English Experience 122). Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1969.

Bartisch, George. [Opthalmodouleia] Das ist Augendienst. Dresden: durch Matthes Stockel, 1583.

Clark, Stuart. Vanities of the Eye. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Colombo, Realdus. De re Anatomica libri XV. Paris: Apud Andream Wechelum, sub Pegaso, in vico Bellouaco, 1562.

Crombie, A.C. “The Mechanistic Hypothesis and the Scientific Study of Vision.” Science, Optics, and Music in Medieval and Early Modern Thought. London: The Hambledon Press, 1990. 175-254?

Crooke, Helkiah. Mikrokosmographia. A Description of the Body of Man. [London]: William Iaggard, 1615.

Davies, John. Nosce Teipsum. London: Richard Field for John Standish, 1599.

Descartes, Rene. Selected Philosophical Writings. New York: Cambridge UP, 1988.

Du Laurens, Andreas Richard Surphlet translation. A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: Of Melancholike Diseases; of Rheums, and of Old age. London: Felix Kingston for Ralph Jacson, 1599.

Guillemeau, Jacques. A Worthy Treatise of the Eyes contayning the knowlege and cure of one hundred and thirteen dieseases, incident unto them. London, 1587.

Hakewill, George. The Vanitie of the Eie. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1608.

Kepler, Johannes. Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena, Quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica Traditur. Francofvrti: Apud Claudium Marnium & Haeredes Ioannis Aubrli, 1604.

Lindberg, David C. Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Paré, Ambroise. The workes of that famous chirurgion Ambrose Parey translated out of Latine and compared with. London: Th[omas] Cotes and R[obert] Young, 1634.

Park, David. The Fire Within the Eye. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1997.

Platter, Felix. De Corporis Humani Structura et Usu. Libri III. Basil: Per Ambrosium Frob., 1583.

Scheiner, Christopher. Oculus Hoc Est: Fundamentum Opticum. Apud Danielem Agricolam, 1619.

Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Volume Two: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy. New York: Brill, 1995.

Summers, David. Vision, Reflection, & Desire in Western Painting. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Tachau, Katherine H. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundation of Semantics. Amsterdam: Brill, 1988.

Tomkis, Thomas. Lingua, or the Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority. London: G. Eld for Simon Waterson, 1607.

Vesalius, Andreas. De Humani Corporis Fabrica. Venice: Apud Franciscum Franciscium & Joannem Criegher, 1568.


[i] For Augustine on the three eyes and the three types of vision see de Genesi ad litteram lib. XII. 6.15 to 7.29. I will talk more about these passages and the concepts of both the corporeal and intellectual species upon which they were based in later posts. Additionally, for a long history of the species, see both Katharine Tachau’s Vision and Certitude and Leen Spruit’s two volume work on the history of the intellectual species.

[ii] I would add, too, that recent critics, challenging the primacy of vision in their own right by tending to the importance of the other four senses often overlook the ways in which medieval and early modern constructions of the sensitive soul stress the interconnectivity of the external senses in the sensus communis. I do think their work makes important contribution to our understanding of the pre-modern sensorium, but would like to see more work that discusses the ways in which the quasi-Aristotelian sensitive soul, as inherited by medieval and early moderns, conjoin the discrete external senses in the inner senses. I intend to challenge the separation of the senses in later posts.

[iii] I will discuss the theories of extramission and intromission in a later post as well. While Lindberg stresses how theories of extramission were abandoned relatively early in elite discourses on optics and vision, there is evidence that the theories persisted popularly for some time following. Lindberg’s focus on elite discourses and in the pursuit of mapping out the discoveries that led to the development towards modern optics lead to ignoring the very real presence of theories of extramission in popular culture for some time following. On the other side of the spectrum, literary critics often fall into the trap of making the opposite claim, implying that the theory of extramission was much more widely accepted in the sixteenth century than they actually were.

[iv] For an excellent discussion of the history of early modern anatomy, see Jonathan Sawday’s The Body Emblazoned.

[v] One could argue that the geocentric model itself made only a strange type of sense in a macrocosm governed by God.  If the earth were important to an omnipotent and immaterial God, then the earth, with the exception of Hell, would be condemned to the basest realm of the cosmos.  David Summers makes a similar point in his Vision, Reflection, & Desire in Western Painting.

[vi] In this post, I would like to attend to the position of the crystalline humor but will discuss this more in a later post.

[vii] Forgive my hack job translation here. If anyone could help clarify and fix my translation, I would be most grateful. The Banister echo cited below probably comes closer to the sentiment in Colombo than my own translation.

[viii] Despite Colombo’s assertion that Vesalius’ error resulted from the dissection of animal rather than human eyes, Colombo’s own distortion gives us pause.  Why would Colombo correct the misplacement of the crystalline humor only somewhat, and why did he maintain a perfectly spherical eye?  We are, of course, in the realm of speculation here, but I would contend that his own error most likely resulted from the same cause that led to Vesalius’.  He simply did not see it, and could not believe the dissected human eye in front of his own living eye. I do not mean to say that Colombo’s charge that Vesalius’ eye was a deliberate distortion or that we have any reason to discount his contention that Vesalius dissected bovine eyes.  The cow’s lens is larger, more spherical, and more central to a cow’s eye but its overall shape is even less spherical than a human’s, and, yet, Vesalius maintains a perfectly spherical eye.  Why, then, would Colombo correct Vesalius’ gross error of the placement of the crystalline humor, yet not correct the overall shape of the eye itself nor place the crystalline humor in its “correct” location towards the front of the eye?  Dissection, I have been told and from vague memories of high school biology, is a messy business.  The body cannot be as neatly “seen” as a diagram supposedly showing the same structures.  Vesalius and Colombo could have accounted for their distortions by chalking them up to, say, the process of removing the eye from the ocular cavity or having pressed too hard while cutting into them, but I do think there is a possibility that they simply could not see the structure because their fantasies were shaped by their understanding of how vision operated.

[ix] I am not sure if more detailed figures were ever included in editions of this work, but my point is that even a crude figure like this offers an eye that more resembles modern optical anatomy than the previous examples.

[x] He also placed the optic nerve, not at the center of the back of the eye but in its more correct position towards one side.

[xi] While the relationship to skepticism exceeds the boundaries of this essay, as it will be an important concern in my other work, I wanted to mention it here.

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Posted in Early Modern Senses, Philosophical Skepticism, Shaping Sense Tagged early modern, vesalius, eye, vision, history of science, history of the senses, Kepler, lens, optical anatomy, anatomy, optics, Augustine, paramaterial, crystalline humor, Platter, Descartes, senses

The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm, and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy. Part Two.

This entry is part [part not set] of 2 in the series The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm, and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy.

The World Turned Upside Down: Revolutions in the Microcosm and Macrocosm and the Crystalline Humor in the Three Eyes of Early Modern Optical Anatomy

Part II. The Revolution of the Eye and De-centering the Eye’s Sovereign

In the first section, I discussed Andre du Laurens’ extended metaphorical treatment of the eye’s structure. There, du Laurens represents the crystalline humor as the “sovereign” of the domain of the eye and as a Herculean figure heroically standing between the external and internal lights. Du Laurens’ metaphorical elaborations reflect and illuminate the importance with which theorists of vision and optical anatomists already attributed to the eye and its structure. The metaphors highlight the emphasis elsewhere on the organization of the eye and the early modern tendency to see correspondences and hierarchies within the structure of nature and the human body. Such popular discourses additionally shaped the understanding of the eye in elite discourses, locking the two in interpenetrating chains of influence.

In the elaborate chains of correspondences slowly eroding yet still powerfully influential in the early modern period, similarities in structure, resemblance, and appearance or in relationships or connections bespoke real rather than simply metaphorical chains of signification. In bestiaries, the appearance or form of an animal bespoke some of its hidden vertues. In herbals, a plant resembling a sexual organ could possess the real power to affect the sexual organs. In a psychophysiological model, the “black bile” of melancholy was or caused “black” thoughts and, in some, delusions of dark shapes. In anatomy, the circular and square figures found in the human form represented the most perfect shapes within the created world. In optical anatomy, the eye’s shape and structure resembled and reflected the structure and order of the cosmos.

Du Laurens sees the image of political authority in the eyes’ structure, and, in this section, I will turn to the eye’s resemblance to the cosmos. As the corporeal world and its light were proper objects in the eyes, its shape, order, and structure and its similarity to the shape, order, and structure of the world carried with it a powerful set of correspondences that shaped the sense of sense.

It is interesting that the revolutions in both theories of the microcosmic eye and theories of the macrocosm occur at roughly the same time and through the influence of Johannes Kepler. Following his contribution to the science of each, there would be revolutions in each that de-centered the central component within both systems. Kepler is probably best known for his contribution to the radical revolution in early modern science that, when elaborated and built upon, overturned the Ptolemaic conception of cosmography. Kepler challenged the Ptolemaic model and defended and elaborated upon the work of Nicholaus Copernicus of nearly a century before. The eventual adoption of the Copernican system with the earth no longer situated at the center of the cosmos de-centered the Earth and its inhabitants within the frame of the universe.

The world turned upside down: A man whose eyes have been turned inward from Bartisch.

The world turned upside down: A man whose eyes have been turned inward from Bartisch.

Less discussed, however, is the revolution Kepler accomplishes in his optical anatomy, which, I argue, remains linked to, and might prove more important than, his role in creating a revolution of the heavens. Discussed lesser still are the changes occurring from roughly 1543 to 1619 of optical anatomy itself. Kepler plays a role in revolutions in both the macrocosm and the microcosm. These dual revolutions and their relationship with the elaborate systems of correspondences in pre-scientific eras that linked microcosm to macrocosm, give me occasion to return to the structure of the Galenic eye and the mediate early modern eye.

The spherical shape of the eye and the placement or near placement of the crystalline humor in its center makes the eye a prime candidate for analogical relationships between the microcosm of the eye and the macrocosm. Such a correspondence did not escape the notice of Helkiah Crooke, who, although he challenges vision’s position as the superior sense, draws on Galen to describe the beautiful structure of the eye, explaining that the primacy of vision might depend, in part, on its shape as well as upon its being a microcosm. Crooke says,

[Galen,] being a man of great and profound knowledge, … considered that the Eye was the true Microcosme or Little world in respect of their exact roundnesse and revolutions: wherein besides the Membranes which I dare boldly call the seaven Spheres of Heaven, there be also the foure Elements found. (Crooke [652][i]).

The “exact roundnesse and revolutions” of the eyes commend them not only as reflections of the macrocosm’s perfection, but also, by virtue of that correspondence, speak to the “excellencie” and nobility of the sense of sight. Crooke notes in an earlier section devoted to the “admirable proportion of [man’s] parts” and the human body as a microcosm that

in this proportion of his parts, you shall finde both a circular figure, which is of all other the most perfect; and also the square, which in the rest of the creatures you shall not observe. (Crooke 6).

In this description of Virtuvian man, Crooke notes that the circle and sphere are “the most perfect” shapes. In many descriptions of the Galenic eye, the perfectly spherical eye and the perfectly centered and spherical crystalline humor bespeak the eye’s importance and grandeur. In emphasizing the human eye’s perfectly spherical shape, Crooke follows both the Galenic eye and the mediate early modern eye’s emphasis on the perfectly orbicular shape. Just as the heavens in a geocentric Ptolemaic system consisted in concentric perfect spheres, the structure of the eye follows that postulated heavenly structure.

In the passage quoted above, one catches another reflection of the macrocosm in the microcosm of the eye. Crooke mentions two more aspects of optical anatomy which argue that the eye is a microcosm within the body. First, he mentions that seven “Membranes” or coats resemble and reflect the “seven Spheres of Heaven,” and, second, that the eye contains “foure Elements.” In the first, the microcosm of the eye includes seven concentric spheres which resemble the Ptolemaic macrocosm. While Crooke does not go on to make such an explicit connection, taking his description one step further, places the crystalline humor in a position that corresponds to the Earth in this Ptolemaic structure of the microcosm, placed at its very center.[ii]

The crystalline humor or lens, when mapped onto this model, occupies the position of the Earth. Such an analogy reveals an interesting aspect of the eyes’ organization in Galenic, and even in the mediate, early modern eyes. The crystalline humor, thought to receive “impressions” or “actualize” the species of external objects, in effect, recreates the visual world within its substance.[iii] The eye not only stands at the center of the microcosm of the eye like the Earth, but also recreates or manufactures simulacra of the world and its objects. I will return to develop the paramaterial aspects of Crooke’s and others’ discussion of the “matter” acquired by the external senses in more detail in a later post.

Second, the microcosmic eye, according to Crooke, contains the four elements of the macrocosm. Crooke rhetorically asks after declaring that there is “Fire” in the eye, that

there is Aire who will denie which understands with what plenty of spirits they do abound? As for Water, who doth not see it in the Eye doth prove himself more blind then a beetle, all the other parts we will liken to the Earth. (Crooke [652]).

According to Crooke, the eye not only reflects the cosmos in its shape and structure, but also in its elemental constitution. Such a description further links the world of the eye to the universe as a whole, analogically confirming that both the eye and the cosmos reflect the majesty of a divine creator. As such, even though Crooke elsewhere shows evidence of post-Colombo ocular anatomy, where the crystalline humor did not occupy the exact center of the eye, and, although he declares touch rather than sight the predominant sense, Crooke still solidifies the eye’s representation as a smaller microcosm nestled within the larger microcosm of the body analogically connected to the macrocosm.

The corporeal eye, with the corporeal world, its objects, and its corporeal light as its objects, conforms to the nature and structure of that world. While I will not go into Crooke’s discussion of the visible species in this essay, I will say that his description also reflects how the eye received or “actualized” mimetic quasi-material, or, as I call them, paramaterial objects that recreated the visible world within the orb of the eye. Even if one does not accept my characterization of the visible and sensible species as paramaterial, the eye still not only reflects the nature of the visible world but also creates mimetic copies of the world upon which it looked.

Such relationships and associations extend beyond the discourses of anatomy and science. Drawing on the same analogical links, university wit Thomas Tomkis gives a similar speech to his character Visus, or vision, in Lingua or Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority.[iv] In Tomkis’ play from the early seventeenth century, the tongue demands to be included as an addition to the five external senses, and disrupts the traditional hierarchy of the external senses by trying to convince the ruler Common Sense that she should not only be considered as a sense but also should sit atop the hierarchy. When called before Common Sense and Phantastes to explain his superiority over the other senses, Visus includes, among other things, his stately residences and their situations in the head, saying,

Under the fore-head of mount Cephalon,
That over-peeres the coast of Microcosme,
All in the shaddowe of two pleasant groves,
Stand my two mansion houses, both as round
As the cleare heavens, both twins as like each other:
As starre to starre, which the vulger sort,
For their resplendent composition,
Are named the bright eyes of mount Cephalon:
With oure faire roomes those lodgings are contrived,
Foure goodly roomes in forme most sphericall,
Closing each other like the heavenly orbes. (Tomkis G2 verso).

In Tomkis’ nesting metaphors, the eyes become a stately “round” manor containing four “goodly roomes” whose perfect sphericality reflect the perfect spheres of the heavens. While Tomkis’ Visus mentions only four rooms rather than seven and while he frames it through the metaphor of the house, he still asserts the structural relationship and analogical links between the eyes and the heavenly spheres.

As with Crooke’s later discussion of the eye’s structure, Tomkis’ Visus offers the eyes’ shape and structural resemblance to the macrocosm as testimony for his supremacy within a hierarchy of the senses. Again, like Crooke, Tomkis might be challenging the conventional understanding of the superiority of sight, but both still continue to underscore how important seeing the eye as a microcosm was during the period.

Again, we find the crystalline humor occupying the central position and represented as the seat of visual power. While Tomkis’ play situates the visual power in subjection to the powers of the internal senses, he also represents the crystalline humor as Visus’ seat, saying that the fourth and most central room is

… smallest, but passeth all the former,
In worth of matter built most sumptuously:
With walls transparent of pure Christaline.
This the soules mirrour and the bodies guide,
Loves Cabinet[,] bright beacons of the Realme,
Casements of light quiver of Cupids shafts:
Wherein I sit and immediatly receive,
The species of things corporeall,
Keeping continuall watch and centinell. (Tomkis G2 verso).

Central to the manor of the eye is the room of “pure Christaline” where Visus “sit[s] and immediatly receive[s]/ The species of things corporeall,” and here we possibly see again, as late as 1607, the model of the Galenic eye. While Tomkis might have been aware of Colombo’s corrections to this arrangement, he does not say so here. As I discussed in part one of this essay, even in texts that represent the mediate early modern eye, including Crooke’s own later Microcosmographia, the verbal descriptions of the mediate early modern eye and the Galenic eye were often spoken of in similar terms. This shows, I think, the power of the analogical relationships and significance of the systems of correspondences that deployed the concept of the microcosm to the figure of the eye, especially when it comes to popular culture even if Tomkis understands the eye as structured like the mediate early modern eye.

Tomkis’ play also dramatizes the connection to the internal senses and its reception of the species in what I am calling the paramaterial mind. While I can provide only a brief sketch here, I will be exploring the paramaterial sensory system more in future posts and provide lengthier sketches in my previous posts. Tomkis represents Visus as subservient to Common Sense, the ultimate seat of judging immediate perception and assembling the discrete species received by the external senses. It was also this system of the paramaterial that the retinal image would help eventually dismantle.

The optical revolution of Felix Platter and Johannes Kepler had already started by the time Thomas Tomkis wrote his play in 1607 and Helkiah Crooke first published his Microcosmographia in 1615. In 1583, Platter argued that the optic nerve was the seat of vision, and, in 1604, Kepler further developed some of Platter’s, achieving a broader acceptance of the retina and the retinal image as the most significant part of the eye. More work needs to be done to map out the lines of transmission of Kepler’s work on optics as it spread and affected optical anatomy, but what is certain is that Kepler’s theory ultimately contributed to a type of conceptual regicide of what André du Laurens previously declared the eye’s “sovereign,” the crystalline humor, and may have had consequences for the system of correspondences that seemed to require the microcosm of the eye’s conformity with and relationship to the macrocosm.

Platter likened the crystalline humor to a looking-glass that projected light upon the retinal screen, describing,

Primario, crystallinus humor, perspicillum est nervi visorii: at qante ipsum & pupilae formen collactus, species oculo illabentes veluti radios colligit, & in ambitum totius retiformis nervi diffundens, res majores ille, ut commodius eas perciperet, perspicilli penit nodo, representat. (Platter 187).

[Primarily the crystalline humor is the perspicillum (*looking glass) for the optic nerve, but as to the crystalline humor and the pupil, the visible species enters as a collection of rays, and diffuses itself on the whole of the retinal nerve, representing bigger things than the small glass represents.]

But Platter never elaborated upon or demonstrated the concept convincingly, and did not, publically and in print anyways, acknowledge that the retinal image would be inverted with respect to horizontal orientation and flipped with respect to the vertical.

This later development and acknowledgement would come with Kepler, who declares:

Visio igitur fit per picturam rei visibilis ad albam retinae & cauum parietem; & quae foris dextra sunt, ad sinistrum parietis larus, sinistra ad dextrum, supera ad inferum, infera ad superum depinguntur: viridia etiam colore viridi, & in universum res quaecunque suo colore intra pingitur; adeo ut, si possibile esset picturam illam in retina foras in lucem protracta permanere, remotis anterioribus, que illam efforma bant, hominiq; alicui sufficiens esset visus acies, is agniturus esset ipsissiman hemisphaerii figuram in tam angusto retine complexu. (Kepler 170).

[The vision then becomes a visible pictura on the white and curved retinal wall, and things which are outside on the right, are depicted on the left wall; left to right, upper to lower, lower to upper. Green colors appear green, and the whole thing, whatsoever its color, is depicted upon the retina, so that, if it were possible for a man to maintain the system’s light on the retina when removing the back of the eye, he would see a figure of the whole hemisphere remains in that small space of the retina.]

Unlike Platter, who described the crystalline humor as the “looking-glass” for the retina and placed the seat of judgment in the optic nerve but did not mention the retinal inversion, Kepler confronts this theory directly and publically in print after developing the theory of the retinal image more extensively than his predecessor. Displacing the crystalline humor itself was an intellectual insurrection, as was the previous trend in early modern optical anatomy that de-centered it within the eye, but acknowledging the retinal inversion began the revolution within the eye in earnest. Both moves, however, challenged not only prior medical authorities that considered the crystalline humor the eye’s sovereign, but also the cultural beliefs surrounding and shaping the sense of the eye and its structure.

Acknowledging that the eye did not see in the same way that either the visual plane laid out before the eye or as it was perceived in the mind that Kepler’s theory is profoundly revolutionary. Not only did such theories allow the retinal screen to usurp the position of primacy previously held by the crystalline humor, but they also turned the eye’s image upside down within the eye itself. The image within the eye, for the first time in recorded human history, was recognized as upside down. From the perspective of an early modern, the world (at least within the eye) no longer looked as it appeared. Revolutionary in both senses, Kepler challenged a fundamental way in which observers perceived and engaged with the world as a whole. I do not mean to suggest that Kepler’s singular genius emerged out of a historical vacuum, but I do want to suggest that the development of the very ability to recognize the inverted retinal image itself and its subsequent effects constituted a real radical shift and break with traditions of the past towards something new and modern even if it took some time for culture to recognize and realize those revolutionary consequences.

The retinal image, itself revolutionary in its movement towards a modern understanding of vision, also had other revolutionary consequences that would only reveal their full effects once the quasi-Aristotelian system of the paramaterial sensory system and mind were altered and abandoned. Whereas previously the crystalline humor received the visible species of corporeal things, transmitting them through the “spirits” to the inner senses and the brain, the retinal wall would eventually become an opaque wall that blocked the paramaterial transmission of these species. The species survived the retinal image and inversion, but, I argue, also challenged some of the conventional popular associations and its traditional theorization. The sensible species and especially the intellectual species persisted in some form until they disappeared into something like the Lockean Idea.

Kepler himself famously chose not to follow the visual image, species, or, as he calls it, pictura as it entered the human brain and mind, saying,

Visionem fieri dico, cum totius hemisphaerii mundani, quod est ante oculum, & amplius paulo, idolum statuitur ad album subrufum retinae cauae superficiei parietam. Quomodo idolum seu pictura haec spiritibus visoriis, qui resident in retina & in neruo, conjungatur, & utrum per spiritus intro in cerebri cauernas, ad animae seu facultatis visoriae tribunal sistatur,an facultas visoria, ceu quaestor ab Anima datus, e cerebri praetorio foras in ipsum neruum visorium & retinam, ceu as inferiora subsellia descendens, idolo huic procededat obuiam, hoc inquam Physicis relinquo disputandum. Nam Opticorum armatura non procedit longius, quam ad hunc usq; opacum parientem, qui primus quidem in oculo occurrit. (Kepler 168).

[I say vision is accomplished, when the whole hemisphere of the world which is before the eye, and bit more, an idolum stands on the curved, reddish-white retinal wall. How the idolum or pictura joins the visual spirits, which reside in the retina and the optic nerve, and whether it is made to appear before the soul and the tribunal of the visual faculty by the spirits in the brain’s caverns, or whether the visual faculty, like a magistrate sent by the soul, descends to the lower court to meet the idolum, I leave to the dispute of physicists. For the opticians’ troops do not advance beyond this first opaque wall met with in the eye.]

Kepler refuses to proceed past the retinal screen, halting his inquiry once he follows the path of light through the lens and onto the rear surface of the eye. Not only does Kepler offer the first explication of the real image formed on the retinal screen, but he also interposes an “opaque wall” between the eye and a perceiver in a way not previously in place in earlier theories of the crystalline humor. Whereas before the images received or formed by the crystalline humor found their way into the inner senses through mediating spirits through to the gatekeeper of the sensus communis, the pictura here seems stuck on the rear wall of the eye.

This additional barrier that strengthens the boundary between the eye and the mind started with Vesalius’ observation that the optic nerve was not hollow. While Kepler gives a nod to the quasi-Aristotelian model of perception in the second half of this passage, it is my contention that the interposed retinal wall further fractured earlier popular theories of sensation and perception. Additionally, I think this wall between the eye and the mind takes part in a general and much broader transition from a paramaterial mind and “selfe” to more of a perimaterial sense of the modern self. In brief, I mean the transition from a less bounded and insular “selfe” towards a less permeable and porous modern self.

As I discussed earlier in my sections on Crooke and Tomkis, even with the revolutionary potential of Kepler’s retinal inversion, the change to popular understandings of vision emerged very slowly, and it was not until Scheiner in 1619 that a representation of the modern eye appeared in print. Just as the Galenic eye might have popularly survived Colombo’s corrective to Vesalius’ optical anatomy, the belief in the centrality of the crystalline humor survived, at least for some time, beyond Kepler. While creating more public controversy, the transition from a Ptolemaic universe to a Copernican one also took some time. While the revolutions in the microcosm and the macrocosm had begun by the first quarter of the sixteenth century, they were far from accomplished or won.

I will now return to several more examples which conjoin the microcosmic eye to the macrocosm in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth. By viewing their symbolic and, perhaps, real connections, we may begin to understand how their fates were aligned in the dual revolutions that overturned previous explanatory models of each, and might partially help explain why both revolutions were roughly historically congruent.

The microcosmic eye like the one found in Tomkis and Crooke uncomplicatedly reflected the majesty and order found in the macrocosm. Pierre La Primaudaye’s The French Academie contains yet another comparison of the microcosm to the macrocosm and the eye’s position within that order. La Primaudaye says,

We have yet another point to bee noted touching their situation, which causeth a certaine proportion and agreement to bee betweene the heavens and the head, and between the eyes of the great and little world, and those of the body and soule. … For this cause, as God hath placed the sunne, moone, and all the rest of the lights above named, and the eyes that are created to receive light from them, and to be that in man who is the little world, which the sunne, moone, and other lights of heaven are in this great universal world. Therefore as much as the eyes are as it were the images of these goodly bodies and celestiall glasses, they occupie the highest place in this body of the world, whereof they are as it were the eyes, to give it light on every side. For this cause also the eyes are more fierie, and have more agreement with the nature of fire, then any other member that belongeth to the corporall senses. … In all these things we see a goodly harmony and agreement betweene the great and the little world, the like whereof wee shall also finde betweene the worlde and the spirituall heaven, whose sunne and light is God, and betweene the eyes of the soule and of the minde. (La Primaudaye 77-78).

In La Primaudaye’s analogy, the eyes represent not the earth but the celestial sphere of the heavens within the microcosm of the body. The eyes receive the light of the world, but also serve as the light of the body. He goes on to suggest that the eyes’ close proximity to the inner senses and especially to reason also confirms their connection to both spiritual as well as bodily light. At the same time, he also notes a distinction between the fleshly or bodily eye and the eyes of the mind and soul by comparing the bodily eye and its received light to the corporeal world and the physical sun to the spiritual heaven whose sun and light is God. La Primaudaye links the corporeal eye to the spiritual or intellectual eye and the corporeal world and light to the divine world and light through a chain of signification and correspondence.

The anagogical significance shines through earlier in La Primaudaye’s discussion of vision when he talks about the special role the bodily, fleshly, or corporeal eye plays in acquiring knowledge and in understanding the divine. He says that the eyes’ “nature approacheth nearer to the nature of the soule and spirit, then any other, by reason of the similitude and agreement that is betweene them,” and proceeds to detail their function in natural and spiritual knowledge and understanding, saying,

…They are given to man chiefly to guide and leade him to the knowledge of God, by the contemplation of his goodly works, which appeare principally in the heavens and in al the order thereof, and whereof we can have no true knowledge & instruction be any other sence but by the eies. For without them who could have noted the divers course and motions of the celestiall bodies? … It is the first Mistresse that provoked men forward to the studie and searching out of science and wisedome. For the sight is ingendered admiration and wondering at things that are seene: and this admiration causeth men afterward to consider more seriously of things … In the end they come to the studie of science and wisedome, which is the knowledge of supernaturall light, namely of the light of the minde, unto which, science and doctrine is as light to the eye, so that it contemplateth and useth by that, as the eye seeth by light. (La Primaudaye 68-69).

The associations and interrelations of the bodily eye and the intellectual eye, and the corporeal light and the light of God were fairly conventional at least since Augustine, and their deployment in both analogical and anagogical systems underscores the conventional parallels and relationships established between them. While distinguished from one another, conventional theories connected the two and helped theorists explain the frisson and connection between the corporeal and spiritual worlds.

Many popular discussions of the superiority of the eye also proclaim that its primary Godly purpose was to acquire knowledge of the world. In this, many stressed the heavens as the best object one’s eyes could focus on to inspire heavenly thoughts and greater contemplations. In his Nosce Teipsum, John Davies, for example, plays with the conventional association with looking to the heavens as leading to knowledge when he describes that

These Mirrors take into their litle space
The formes of Moone and Sunne, and every Starre,
Of every Body, and of every place,
Which with the worlds wide Armes embraced are.
Yet their best object, and their noblest use,
Hereafter in another world will bee,
When God in them shall heavenly light infuse,
That face to face they may their Maker see.
Here are they guides, which do the Body leade;
Which else would stumble in eternall night;
Here in this world they do much knowledge reade,
And are the Casements which admit most light. (Davies 42).

Davies suggests that true knowledge and a true light will not come to the eyes until after death, but he also associates the corporeal light of the world with knowledge suggesting that that corporeal light, as in La Primaudaye, can lead to contemplation of higher things.

Science, including astronomy and anatomy, derives from the wonder generated by the corporeal eye, leading a perceiver from the physical sensation, to contemplation of the natural world, to a contemplation of God’s magnificence. It was the searching eyes of astronomers and anatomists that would soon challenge the conceptions of both the microcosmic eye and the macrocosm.

This returns me to the Augustine notion of three eyes with which I opened this post. While Augustine established three types of eye (the bodily eye, the spiritual eye, and the intellectual eye), all three converge and are mediated by what I call the paramaterial Phantasy in many sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century theories of sensation, perception, and cognition. While La Primaudaye too distinguishes the bodily eye and corporeal light from the spiritual eye and heavenly light, both reflect and resemble one another, interlocking them in a theoretical system and conceptual order that represented them as interrelated and mutually informing. It was the second eye, which, according to Augustine, was the eye of the spirit, but which according to many early modern variations was the eye of the mind, the Phantasy which was often thought to mediate the relationship between the external senses and the intellect and soul.

Not everyone had faith in the powers of the bodily eye and its corporeal light, however. In some theological accounts, the bodily or fleshly eye can lead one into spiritual blindness. The implication lies behind the passage from the La Primaudaye quotation above but the relationship remains one widely repeated in the early modern period. George Hakewill, English Calvinist theologian, argues that the bodily eye can lead to spiritual blindness and sin. Hakewill’s Vanitie of the Eye details many spiritual diseases resulting from the bodily eye, criticizing those who overly commend it, saying,

Though manie and singular bee the commendations of the nature and frame of the eie, & the use of it in the ordinary course of life bee no lesse diverse then excellent as wel for profit as delight, yet the dangerous abuses which arise from it not rightly guided, are so generall, and almost inseparable, that it may justly grow to a disputable question whither wee should more regard the benefit of nature in the one, or the hazard of grace and vertue in the other. (Hakewill 1).

For someone like Hakewill, the bodily eye leads to spiritual corruption in the form of lust, greed, envy, and other sins dependent upon or having their origin in vision. Later, when listing the diseases incident to the eye, he includes, “those which are many times imparted from the distemper of the braine (with which the eie holdes a marvelous correspondence)” (Hakewill 93). Because of the psychophysiological model of the embodied mind, the distempered brain can affect the eye, and the unruly eye can distemper the brain, and both, to some extent, can undermine the soul. It is this conjunction that I attempt to explore in my work on the paramaterial Phantasy.

Even La Primaudaye, who valorizes sight and champions its role in the production of knowledge of the world and of God elsewhere in the same book, cautions against the power of the corporeal eye. While I will expand upon this idea in later posts, the bodily, mental, and spiritual eyes converge in a much more ominous way in a later passage from The French Academie. La Primaudaye cautions people about the types of objects and images their bodily eyes receive. Like Hakewill later, La Primaudaye warns,

let us beware that we feede them not with the sight profane and dishonest things, least they serve to poyson the minde and soule, whereas they ought to become messengers, to declare unto it honest & healthful things. For he that doth otherwise is worthy to have, not onely his bodily eyes put out, & pluckt out of his head but also the eyes of his minde, that so he be may blinde both in body & soule, as it commonly falleth out to many. (La Primaudaye 79).

The three eyes are related through the reference to “poyson,” as the bodily sights are said to “poyson the minde and soule.” While metaphorical, the interrelation of the bodily, mental, and spiritual eyes exceeds metaphor in the way in which many of the references to them explain sensation, perception, and cognition. Just as the corporeal eye could lead to divine contemplation and the illumination of divine light as we saw in my previous example from La Primaudaye, he additionally argues that the bodily eye could also lead to bodily and spiritual corruption.

In addition to the mental and spiritual consequences resulting from a corrupt bodily eye as we have seen in La Primaudaye and Hakewill, still others challenged the type of knowledge the corporeal eye could acquire. The philosophical skeptics, even before Descartes, questioned the knowledge humans could gain through the bodily senses. For them, the eye along with the other bodily senses could not provide certitude or verify judgment. It is my contention that while sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century philosophical skepticism resembles the later seventeenth century developments as one sees with Descartes, those earlier skeptical movements and arguments were expressed through a quasi-Aristotelian and Galenic understanding of the sensitive soul. The developments in optical anatomy might have shifted the epistemological horizons even as they deployed tropes available at least since the time of Sextus Empiricus. Skeptics often challenged the paramaterial nature of the mind and its objects, emphasizing enclosure and the individual in what I call a perimaterial system. (See my previous post on philosophical skepticism here, and my sketch of the paramaterial and perimaterial here).

The eye as microcosm survived the challenge Colombo offered when correcting the situation of the crystalline humor within the eye. This process of de-centering the eye’s long-standing sovereign and seat of the visual power happened over the course of the time period from roughly 1543 to 1619, and although it would take much longer before its full effects were felt, the revolutionary potential of such a change in optical anatomy should be recognized. Later philosophers like René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and George Berkley were still grappling with some of the ramifications of the real image within the eye well into the eighteenth century.

Part of this new approach to physiology was to split the function of the eye from the broader understanding of “vision,” and refusing to speculate beyond the mechanical processes that occurred within the eye. Kepler declared that the mental processing of sensory data was beyond the scope of his argument, and as David C. Lindberg puts it “optics, [Kepler] argues, ceases with the formation of the picture on the retina, and what happens after that is somebody else’s business.” Lindberg suggestively notes,

It is perhaps significant that Kepler employed the term pictura in discussing the inverted retinal image, for this is the first genuine instance in the history of a real optical image within the eye—a picture, having an existence independent of the observer, formed by the focusing of all available rays on the surface. (Lindberg 202).

What Lindberg lauds as the first “real optical image within the eye” also points towards the extinction of another form of “image” within the eye that “had an existence” that was not “independent of the observer,” and, as I will argue, the extinction of images within the mind of that observer that resembled the world it represented. While not, according to Lindberg, a “real optical image within the eye” the previous image within the eye was something more, a product of an eye that depended upon the living eye of an observer that was thought to have more contact with the external world, and, even more importantly, perceived that world with the same orientation as perceived by the mind through images that resembled their objects.

Altering that previous arrangement, not only in the process of de-centering the crystalline humor but also in the Keplerian revolution that made the lens subservient to the retina and its retinal image, might challenge the important system of correspondences established between the eye and the macrocosm. This might partially help explain Vesalius’ misrepresentation of the crystalline humor as well as the continued reiterations of the mediate early modern eye in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While we have no reason to doubt Colombo’s criticism of Vesalius’ dependence upon the animal eyes for his optical anatomy, and while incredibly speculative on my part, it is possible that the importance assigned to the central placement of the crystalline humor colored Vesalius’ perception of his optical anatomy. The anatomist, coming to the eye with cultural constructions and an a priori understanding of the eye’s function, found his perception of the eye shaped such constructions, not allowing him to see what was before his own eyes.

What is less speculative is that variations of the Galenic eye persisted to a degree well after Vesalius’ mistake was registered and noted and that those depicting the mediate early modern eye often did so through descriptions developed out of the earlier model. One wonders why early modern optical anatomists did not develop a modern representation of the eye until 1619 with the lens positioned just behind the pupil and towards the very front of the eye and without representing the whole of the eye as a perfect sphere. In this, I am more convinced that the a priori system of correspondences which structured the perception of the eye distorted its position because of the stress on the microcosmic structure of the eye as well as upon the centrality of the crystalline humor in the process of vision.

As I discussed in the conclusion of part one of this essay, I believe these popular beliefs and cultural constructions shaped discourses on ocular anatomy, which were, in turn, shaped by them. The system of correspondences and the emphasis on the eye as a microcosm reflected the shape, order, and majesty of the macrocosm. Historically congruous, the de-centering of the microcosmic eye and the de-centering of the Earth within the macrocosm historically emerge together to challenge long-standing authorities and chains of significance. The changes to optical anatomy might not have faced the same type of outrage as the reorganization of the cosmos, but it would profoundly shape and influence subsequent thinkers and their theories of sensation, perception, and cognition.

The system of correspondences, an a priori system of interconnections between world and cosmos, part and whole, slowly decayed under the developing power of a posteriori experimental science. At the same time, those systems of correspondences did not quickly or easily relinquish their hold on the understanding of the world and of the human body even as the new scientific gaze loosened their grip. It was precisely this power of mental Idols which Francis Bacon hoped to eradicate from his New Science because their influence could shape and distort an understanding of the world (see my previous post on Bacon’s Idols here). Even before Bacon, Vesalius attempted to correct the undue influence of classical thought on an understanding of the body, but, for whatever reason, his own work fails in the case of his representation of the eye. Those cultural constructions shaped and informed the development of the New Science even as that New Science attempted to strip knowledge of those very classical and cultural accretions from their perception of reality.

Just as the Copernican revolution would metaphorically turn the world upside down, the Keplerian discovery of the retinal image literally turned the world upside down with respect to the eye. Somewhat displaced from the center of the eye’s orb, the lens, in Kepler’s formulation, played a subservient role to the retinal screen, upon which visible reality was projected. The images within the eye no longer “impressed” themselves on the crystalline humor or bore the same orientation as objects in the external world or as they appeared in the mind of a perceiver, and were, instead, projected upon a curved surface and flipped with respect to vertical and horizontal orientations. Once this explanation eventually replaced the theories which declared the crystalline humor the seat of vision, the image within the eye no longer matched the visual field or the way in which the visual field appeared within the mind. I will return to these ideas more extensively in later posts, but want to say now that this new understanding radically split sensation from perception and, arguably, had ramifications for both the development of mind-body dualism, philosophical skepticism, and formation of the modern self.

While I agree to some extent with David C. Lindberg that Kepler’s theory “at bottom … remained solidly upon a medieval foundation,” I do believe that the retinal image offered a revolutionary change with respect to a person’s theorized orientation with the world despite this medieval foundation. While the full extent of the revolutionary implications would take some time to affect broader cultural shifts, the very fact that Kepler recognized and proposed an image within the eye neither conforms directly to the visual field before it nor to perception as experienced in the mind already took a revolution to see the retinal image as even a possibility. Kepler’s retinal image, of course, finally dethroned the crystalline humor as the seat of vision, but, even before this, anatomists challenged the notion that the crystalline humor occupied the physical center of the eye.[v] In this development, anatomies of the eye moved the crystalline humor from its place of prominence at the center of vision to a de-centered place.

The revolution of the eye involved in unseating the crystalline humor as the centralized power of the human eye, but it also literally de-centered the seat altogether. I cannot help but think this moment of de-centering within the microcosm of the eye itself prefigured and paved the way for radical re-envisioning and restructuring the macrocosm. I also cannot help but think that Kepler’s discovery of the retinal image and the consequent displacing of the crystalline humor combined with the Copernican revolution also helped dismantle the importance of the a priori system of correspondences between microcosm and macrocosm altogether. While I will return in a later post to discuss the emergent tensions between the paramaterial and the perimaterial and the type of philosophical skepticism that was available in the period preceding the real image’s influence upon the sensory system, systems of cognition, and the sense of “selfe,” I must for now, like Kepler, stop at the “opaque wall” of the retinal screen.

Works Cited

Banister, John. The Historie of Man. London 1578. (The English Experience 122). Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1969.

Bartisch, George. [Opthalmodouleia] Das ist Augendienst. Dresden: durch Matthes Stockel, 1583.

Clark, Stuart. Vanities of the Eye. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Colombo, Realdus. De re Anatomica libri XV. Paris: Apud Andream Wechelum, sub Pegaso, in vico Bellouaco, 1562.

Crombie, A.C. “The Mechanistic Hypothesis and the Scientific Study of Vision.” Science, Optics, and Music in Medieval and Early Modern Thought. London: The Hambledon Press, 1990. 175-254?

Crooke, Helkiah. Mikrokosmographia. A Description of the Body of Man. [London]: William Iaggard, 1615.

Davies, John. Nosce Teipsum. London: Richard Field for John Standish, 1599.

Descartes, Rene. Selected Philosophical Writings. New York: Cambridge UP, 1988.

Du Laurens, Andreas Richard Surphlet translation. A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: Of Melancholike Diseases; of Rheums, and of Old age. London: Felix Kingston for Ralph Jacson, 1599.

Guillemeau, Jacques. A Worthy Treatise of the Eyes contayning the knowlege and cure of one hundred and thirteen dieseases, incident unto them. London, 1587.

Hakewill, George. The Vanitie of the Eie. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1608.

Kepler, Johannes. Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena, Quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica Traditur. Francofvrti: Apud Claudium Marnium & Haeredes Ioannis Aubrli, 1604.

Lindberg, David C. Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Paré, Ambroise. The workes of that famous chirurgion Ambrose Parey translated out of Latine and compared with. London: Th[omas] Cotes and R[obert] Young, 1634.

Park, David. The Fire Within the Eye. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1997.

Platter, Felix. De Corporis Humani Structura et Usu. Libri III. Basil: Per Ambrosium Frob., 1583.

Scheiner, Christopher. Oculus Hoc Est: Fundamentum Opticum. Apud Danielem Agricolam, 1619.

Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Volume Two: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy. New York: Brill, 1995.

Summers, David. Vision, Reflection, & Desire in Western Painting. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Tachau, Katherine H. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundation of Semantics. Amsterdam: Brill, 1988.

Tomkis, Thomas. Lingua, or the Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority. London: G. Eld for Simon Waterson, 1607.

Vesalius, Andreas. De Humani Corporis Fabrica. Venice: Apud Franciscum Franciscium & Joannem Criegher, 1568.


[i] Misnumbered as page 646 in the 1615 edition.

[ii]It should be noted that there was some controversy regarding the number of membranes of the eye. While Galen, Vesalius, Crooke and others affirm there were seven membranes, others, like Realdus Colombo, John Banister following him, and others affirmed there were only six.

[iii] I argue that in the pre-Keplerian system of vision that I call paramaterial, these species, including the species acquired by the other senses and re-conjoined by the common sense, retain some theoretical connection between them and their external object originals in many popular discussions, but, even aside from my arguments about the paramaterial, the crystalline humor receives or creates simulacra of external objects.

[iv] While this play has received critical attention spearheaded by the ever insightful Patricia Parker and Carla Mazzio, no one, to my knowledge, has yet discussed the importance of Tomkis’ Visus, Common Sense, and Phantastes. I will discuss Tomkis’ representation of Common Sense and Phantastes in a separate post as they pertain to the paramaterial Phantasy.

[v] I should note that I also think the development of linear perspective in the visual arts probably contributed to the discovery of the retinal image. I would like to talk more about this as an influence on its development but have not yet done the reading necessary to make such a claim at this time. Additionally, the ultimate assertion by Descartes and others that the eye works like a camera obscura reveals that it too made an important contribution to the recognition of the retinal image.

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Posted in Scholarship, Early Modern Senses, Philosophical Skepticism, Shaping Sense Tagged vision, Helkiah Crooke, History of medicine, history of science, Kepler, optics, paramaterial, Ambroise Paré, science, anatomy, senses, Augustine, sight, Descartes, skepticism, early modern

Part I: “Envious people be the greateste mortherers of the worlde & gretest theves”: Othello III.iii. 160-166 and Richard Pynson’s 1506 The Kalender of Shepherdes. A Possible New Source for Othello.

This entry is part [part not set] of 1 in the series “He that filches from me my good name”: Envy, the Kalender of Shepherds, and the “iii Edgyd sworde” of Iago’s Tongue. A Possible New Source for Othello.

“He that filches from me my good name”: Envy, the Kalender of Shepherds, and the “iii Edgyd sworde” of Iago’s Tongue. A Possible New Source for Othello.

Part I: “Envious people be the greateste mortherers of the worlde & gretest theves”: Othello III.iii. 160-166 and Richard Pynson’s 1506 The Kalender of Shepherdes

In Shakespeare’s Proverbial Language, R. W. Dent identifies Iago’s lines in III. iii.,

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed (III.iii. 160–166),

as a variation on the proverb that “a good name is more valuable than gold” (Dent 180), a commonplace deriving from biblical instructions on “good names” found in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. Proverbs 22:1 instructs that “a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches,” and Ecclesiastes 7:1 declares “A good name is better than precious ointment.” These two verses served as the foundation for the construction of more elaborate later commonplaces.

As early as 1931, Hardin Craig argued that the instruction on “good names” was a “moralistic commonplace” (Craig 625). While the lines are almost certainly a moralistic commonplace derived from Scripture, some scholars offer sources for Iago’s lines about “good names.” Amongst the chief contenders for those attributing Iago’s lines to a source are Pierre La Primaudaye’s The French Academie and Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique. Craig dismisses such attributions in his essay exploring the problems and complications of attributing sources when the line in question is a commonplace, but he does develop the most comprehensive account of such attempts and positions Iago’s instruction on good names within a larger cultural context. Nevertheless, to this list of possible yet problematic sources, I would like to add a third contender for consideration, the 1506 Richard Pynson translation and edition of the widely popular French miscellany The Kalender of Shepherdes. While I ultimately agree that identifying a single source for Iago’s reiteration of a moralistic commonplace might be impossible, I do believe by adding it to the list of possibilities and by comparing the similarities among the main contenders and to Othello, we can understand something about the way in which early moderns represented envy, good names, and envy’s effect upon them.

The title page woodcut from the Powell 1556 edition of The Kaldender of Shepardes

The title page woodcut from the Powell 1556 edition of The Kaldender of Shepardes

Craig’s main target of criticism are scholars at the time who claimed Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique as the source of Iago’s lines on good names. In his description of the rhetorical device of “Amplification,” Wilson notes that

The places of Logique helpe ofte for Amplification. As, where men have a wronge opinion, and thynke theft a greater faulte than slaunder, one myght prove the contrarye as well by circumstaunces as by argumentes. And first, he might shewe that slaunder is thefte, and that everye slaunderer is a thief. For as well the slaunderer as the thiefe doe take away an other mannes possession against the owners will. After that he might shewe that a slaunderer is worse than anye thiefe, because a good name is better than all the goodes in the worlde: and that the losse of money maye be recovered, but the losse of a mannes good name cannot be called backe againe, and a thefe maye restore that agayne which he hath taken awaye, but a slaunderer cannot geve a man his good name againe, which he hath taken from him. Agayne, he that stealeth goodes or cattell, robbes only but one man, but an evill tongued man infecteth all their mindes: unto whose eares this reporte shall come. (Wilson 68v).

Here, we see a reflection of Iago’s lines from III.iii.. The slanderer supposedly steals a “possession” of another like a thief, and the passage goes on to note that, unlike the thief’s stolen property, the slanderer cannot return a stolen good name. Lacking from Wilson, as Craig also notes, is the further move that the slanderer does not gain anything from his theft, and Craig uses this fact to discount attributing Wilson as the source of Iago’s lines. Further troubling the attribution waters, Wilson draws not only from commonplaces about good names in general, but also from Juan Louis Vives’s De Conscribendis Epistolis (1531) in particular.1

To further discount claims that argue for The Arte of Rhetorique as the source of Iago’s lines, Craig offers a more compelling alternative in Pierre La Primaudaye’s The French Academie. Craig claims The French Academie is the “only [text] in which this particular example is used” (Craig 625) in relation to envy,

Of this wild plant of envie, backbiting is a branch, which delighteth and feedeth it selfe with slandering and lying, whereupon good men commonly receive great plagues, when they over-lightly give credit to backbiters … For seeing good name and credite is more pretious than any treasure, a man hath no lesse injurie offered him when his good name is taken away, than when he is spoiled of substance. (La Primaudaye 460).

Primaudaye’s passage on the value of a good names comes in close proximity to another passage in The French Academie explaining that slander and backbiting do not profit the envious, “this malignity is a delight & pleasure taken in another mans harme, although we receive no profit thereby” (La Primaudaye 458). Craig considers the two in conjunction as presenting “all three of the ideas in the Shakespearean passage, namely, that good name is a treasure, that to be slandered is to be robbed, and that slander is without profit to the slanderer” (Craig 625), but discounts La Primaudaye as the source of Iago’s lines, citing it to evidence its proverbial nature and deny previous attributions to Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique.

While Craig does identify portions of The French Academie that resemble Iago’s later lines and that link slander to envy, he fails to notice a similar passage found in the earlier Rycharde Pynson 1506 edition of The Kalender of Shepherdes. After its initial publication in French by Guy Marchant in 1491, and its substantial expansion in 1493, The Kalendrier des Bergiers became an international phenomenon, and the nineteen English editions of The Kalender from the first “corrupt” edition of 1503 to 1631 testify to its popularity.2

Defying notions of a stable text, every edition of The Kalender contains variations, and is primarily composed of and constitutes a collection of commonplaces and proverbs. The “corrupt” 1503 Paris edition, translated by an unknown author into a Scottish dialect, contains numerous errors and mistranslations, but was seemingly popular enough to serve as the basis for the 1506 Richard Pynson edition. There are indications that the translator of the Pynson edition did not return to the French originals, and, instead, worked from the 1503 Paris edition in an attempt to make it more readable. Two years after Pynson’s edition, Wynkn de Worde’s 1508 edition returned to the French texts to develop a new translation, as did subsequent editions. The translation, attributed to Richard Copland, became the standard translation from that point forward. As such, the Pynson edition contains many more variations and constitutes a much freer translation of the Kalender of Shepherds than other editions.

Lazarus encounters envy and the hellish punishments for the envious.

Lazarus encounters envy and the hellish punishments for the envious.

One such variation in the 1506 Pynson edition’s description of the punishments for the envious, might have a relationship to Iago’s lines. The multiple variations on this proverb on “good names” may ultimately reveal that Shakespeare’s articulation itself was, as Craig argues, a moralistic commonplace, but, like The French Academie, The Kalender of Shepherdes specifically links the proverb to the envious tongues of slanderers and backbiters like Iago’s in its description of the pains of sinners in hell. In the section describing the punishment for the envious, The Kalender says,

also the envious people be the greateste mortherers of the worlde & gretest theves for they robe and kyll bothe body and soule fyrste they robe man as thus in takynge awaye his gode name for by cause gode name is better than rychesse therefore they be theves to take awaye that that they can nat gyve agayne if a thefe stele a mannys gode yet it may be possybyll to be restoryed of it agayne, but the gode name may never be restoryde. Also they be murtherers for they kyll themselfe bothe body and soule without the greate marcy of god & repentaunce. (Kalender of Shepherdes sig. F4v)

The Pynson Kalender of Shepherdes describes the envious as “murderers” as well as “thieves” but also meditates, like the later Wilson and Iago, on how much worse the theft of “gode name[s]” are than the theft of worldly goods. As with Wilson’s much later The Arte of Rhetorique, the Pynson edition of the Kalender does lack the final meditation on how the thief-like slanderer does not even profit from his theft.

This version and elaboration upon the commonplace on “good names” only appears in the Pynson edition of The Kalender of Shepherdes.3 It also diverges from the French originals by having no corollary in the Kalendrier et compost des bergiers.4 With some minor variations, nearly every subsequent edition of The Kalender does not mention good names, instead including an alternate passage about those who wish to “profit” by slander and backbiting. As the 1556 Powell edition has it,

The envyous folke seketh theyr welthe in the adversitie of other, as when of the harme of other they seke the good in rejoysynge them, but with this they be not yet satysfyed, but of a newe they byn tourmented, for they have not such joye without displeasaunce and affliction at theyr harte, whereby they be tourmented. For he that seketh his welthe in the adversitie of an other, is lyke to hym that seketh the fyre in the bottome of a water, or that loketh for woll on an urchyns backe, the which thynges be but all follyes and abusions. (Kalendar of Shepardes sig.E6r).

The earlier 1503 Paris edition puts it similarly5even using its peculiar Scottish dialect and spelling:

Part of the description of Hell's punishment of the envious from the 1503 Paris edition of The Kalendayr of Shyppars.

Part of the description of Hell’s punishment of the envious from the 1503 Paris edition of The Kalendayr of Shyppars.

(The Kalendayr of the Shyppars sig. E2v)

All of the later editions I have looked at all lack the passage about “good names” and instead include a similar, if not identical, translation as the Powell edition I cited previously. In these passages, we once again see, as in The French Academie and in Othello, the emphasis on the unprofitability of slander. While these lines about the unprofitability of envy do not appear in the same edition as the lines that resemble Iago’s in III.iii., nearly all of the elements contained in Iago’s speech can be found between the Pynson and the other English editions.6 Because of this, the 1506 Pynson Kalender does not contain all of the elements of Iago’s lines, and despite Craig’s warning against attributing sources to commonplaces and proverbs, I do think there is enough evidence to consider it a possibility.7

What intrigues me about this possibility is that, if one could identify the Pynson passage as being the source of Iago’s discussion of good names, Shakespeare would be playing a particularly interesting intertexual game. This passage, lifted from a description of the punishments for the sin of envy, would then be placed in the mouth of the envious Iago. As we are all aware, Iago begins to “infect” the Moor with his “poison” in this very scene, which will ultimately succeed in “ensnar[ing Othello’s] soul and body” (V.ii. 308). To instruct Othello to safeguard the possession of his “good name,” Iago would speak through words that relate to Iago’s own sin and the very practice of slander which he is beginning to engage.

As I have said, this passage in the Pynson edition occurs in the section of The Kalender describing Hell’s punishment of the envious. The section provides an unusual framing narrative in which Lazarus, returned from the dead, describes the horrors he witnessed in Hell before Christ raised him.8 Often referred to as the “Vision of Lazarus,” Lazarus describes a horrifying journey through the punishments Hell meets out for those guilty of the seven deadly sins. The condensed “Vision of Lazarus” found in various editions of The Kalender follow Lazarus through Hell, describing each torture he witnessed with both a verbal and pictorial depiction. Lazarus first describes “wheles … full of hokes and crampes of yron” upon which “were hangyd and tormentyd proude men and women” (Kalender of Shepherdes F4r). Second, Lazarus “sawe a flode of frosone yce in the whiche envyous men & women were poungyd unto the navyll & than sodenly came a colde wynde ryght great that blewe and dyd depe downe all the envyous men & women into the colde water that nothynge was sene of them” (F4r). Third, he describes “a cave foule and stynkynge where Irefull men and women be smyten throughe with swordes” (F5r). Fourth, Lazarus comes upon “an horybyll darke hole in hell” where serpents “byte and stynge … the slowthefull,” gnawing their bodies to the heart (F5r). Fifth, he describes “cawderons” full of boiling metals and oil “in whiche was depyde covetes men and wemen” (F6r). Sixth, he “sawe in a vale a fare fowle and stynkynge” meal of “todys & other venymous wormes” fed to “glotones” (G1r). Lastly, Lazarus encounters a “depe welles ful of fyre and brimstone” for the “lecherous” (G1v). While The Kalenders pull the order and the woodcuts of the Vision of Lazarus from the earlier Ars Moriendi, the descriptions of each punishment radically condense and adapt the material sound in their earlier source.

The Kalenders, though more condensed in their descriptions of Hell’s punishments, offer more moralization on each sin than their Ars Moriendi counterparts. Whereas the Ars Moriendi provides richer descriptions of the pains experienced by the damned, The Kalendar provides a brief snapshot of those torments and goes on to describe each sin much more thoroughly than those earlier models. It is in this expansion of describing envy that gave Pynson’s translator the flexibility for further variation. Viewing the intertextual relationships opened up by considering The Kalender alongside Shakespeare’s Othello, however, does make me wonder if the Vision of Lazarus stands behind Othello’s lines after he has killed Desdemona,

Whip me, ye devils,
From the possession of this heavenly sight.
Blow me about the winds, roast me in sulphur,
Wash me in the steep-down gulfs of liquid fire! (V.ii.284-287).

While possibly referencing the torments of the damned offered by Dante’s Inferno, viewing these lines in relationship to the Ars Moriendi and The Kalender’s depiction of infernal torments leads to some interesting insights. It s not unreasonable to suppose that the incredibly horrific depictions of hellish torments found in these prose traditions influence and merge with Dante’s vision of hell in the English imagination. At the same time, the number of popular versions of the Vision of Lazarus between the many English editions of The Kalender and in English translations of texts in the tradition of the Ars Moriendi, suggest their descriptions of Hell might play just as important a role in imagining infernal torment.

For Dante, being blown about the winds is the punishment meted out to lustful souls, being whipped by devils might refer to the fate of seducers. For an Othello continually fearful about human sexuality, the thought that he will be punished for lust and lechery makes sense, and, this too, appears in the relationship to The Kalender’s punishments for the lustful. Viewed in relation to The Kalender, however, being “blow[n] … about the winds” might have another valence. The Vision of Lazarus’ envious are perpetually blown down by winds as they attempt to free themselves from the icy water in which they become submerged.

But surely Iago is the figure of envy while Othello is the figure of jealousy, right? While I will not go into early modern representations of envy and jealousy in detail in this post, I do want to note what I find the most interesting aspect of viewing the intertextual potential of viewing Shakespeare’s Othello alongside The Kalender of Shepherds. In another section, The Kalender presents two trees, a Tree of Vice and a Tree of Virtue, describing the various branches of each type of virtue and vice. Among the branches of envy, The Kalender includes “beleve over sone” under the “vi. braunche of envy,” “Suspeccyone” (Kalender of Shepherdes sig. D5r). While some authors stress the distinction between jealousy and envy, here, heeding slander offered by an envious tongue is itself a form of envy.

The sixth branch of envy as found in Richard Pynson's 1506 edition of The Kalender of Shepeherds

The sixth branch of envy as found in Richard Pynson’s 1506 edition of The Kalender of Shepeherds

For Othello, who listens to and eventually believes Iago’s slanderous tongue, his believing too readily or too soon might reveal his own infection of envy. While Iago embodies nearly every form of envy The Kalender lists as the branches of envy, the sixth branch most resembles Othello’s jealous suspicion of his wife. Becoming a great “murderer” along with the great “thief” Iago, the two resemble the two forms of envy described by nearly every edition of The Kalender. The 1506 Pynson edition concludes the Vision of Lazarus’ description of envy by saying,

…They be mortherers for they kyll them selfe bothe body and soule without the greate marcy of god & repentaunce. The envyous mannys tonge may be lekenyde to a iii. edgyd sworde that hurteth & cottys iii. wayes. The fy[r]the he hurteth and woundeth his owne soule seconde he that a tellythe the tale to. The iii. is he that a tellythe the tale by. (Kalender of Shepherdes sig. F5r).

The three nodes of envy’s circuit infect and injure each triangulated point. As with the branches of envy, the person who listens and believes the lies told by an envious tongue are implicated in the process, implying or manifesting that they too are infected with envy.

In William Shakespeare’s Othello, we see several triangulated systems of slander and envy, one of which ends with a literal murder. Iago, the envious “demi-devil” that “ensnare[s Othello’s] body and soul” (V.ii.307-8), uses his triple edged sword against the good names of Cassio and Desdemona, stealing, at least temporarily, their good names with the end result of trying to murder the one and succeeding with the other. The cycle of envy, like the cycle of slander, works through triangulation, where each circuit in the chain becomes damaged. The infectious and deadly plague spreads through the air carrying language, “hurting and cutting,” infecting and polluting, and murdering and maiming good names, bodies, and souls.

As this type of attribution of sources is no longer in fashion within scholarly discourses, no one, to my knowledge, has ever offered this as a possible source of Iago’s lines in Othello III.iii., but I do want to note that Craig was incorrect to assert that La Primaudaye’s was the only source in which this commonplace is used in relation to envy. The Pynson Kalender pre-dates both of the other possibilities, and, while it does not include the passage on the unprofitability of slander, it, like the French Academie, does directly link the commonplace to the sin of envy and, unlike the French Academie, mentions “good names” directly.

In and of itself, such a find might not mean much, and might only serve to further argue that Shakespeare’s lines on “good names” were merely a well established commonplace, but in the next section I explore how looking at these possible “sources” in conjunction might shed light on early modern understandings of envy and their relationship with Shakespeare’s Othello. It also builds an intertextual bridge between Othello and the Kalender of Shepherds and locates Shakespeare’s play within a field of discourses on envy, and, by triangulating the three possible influences on Iago’s lines, we can explore the similarities among their representations of slander, envy, and “good names.”

 

Bibliography

Craig, Hardin. “Shakespeare and Wilson’s ‘Arte of Rhetorique,’ an Inquiry into the Criteria for Determining Sources.” Studies in Philology 28.4 (1931): 618–630. JSTOR. Web. 1 May 2013.

Dent, Robert William. Shakespeare’s Proverbial Language: An Index. University of California Press, 1981.

Driver, Martha W. “When Is a Miscellany Not Miscellaneous? Making Sense of the ‘Kalender of Shepherds’.” The Yearbook of English Studies 33 (2003): 199. CrossRef. Web. 7 May 2013.

Heinrich Oskar Sommer, Charles Praetorius. The Kalender of Shepherdes: The Edition of Paris 1503 in Photographic … K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & co.,ltd., 1892. Internet Archive. Web. 4 May 2013.

Kalendar of Shepardes. Here Begynneth the Kalender of Shepardes. Newely Augmented and Corrected. Anr. ed. London: [W. Powell], 1556.

Kalender of Shepherdes. Her[e Be]gy[n]neth the Kalender of Shepherdes. [London] : Impryntyd at London in Flete strete at the sygne of the George by Rycharde Pynson …, M.CCCCC.and.vi. [1506], 1506. Early English Books Online.

La Primaudaye, Pierre de. The French Academie. Trans. T.B. Imprinted at London : By Edmund Bollifant for G. Bishop and Ralph Newbery, 1586.

Shakespeare, William, and Stephen Greenblatt. The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition. Norton, 1997. Print.

The Kalendayr of the Shyppars. Prentyt i[n] parys: by Antoine Verard, 1503.

Wilson, Thomas. The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Vse of All Suche as Are Studious of Eloquence, Sette Forth in English, by Thomas Wilson. [London: Richardus Graftonus, typographus regius excudebat], 1553.

 

  1. Craig additionally details that Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique “apparently borrowed the idea. And condensed and adapted” a passage from Juan Louis Vives’s De Conscribendis Epistolis (1531), which says,
    Sapientis est famae suae longe diligentius, quam opibus suis, non minvus vero diligenter quam vitae consulare. Minus siquidem damni, & incommode accipit, qui pecuniam, aut etiam amissa sarciri potest, fama semel amissa, in integrum resituitur nunquam. Et vita quidem corpris, quum certos a natura terminus acceperit, in longum tempus extendi nequit…. Quod si homines iis rebus maxime timere videmus, quae cum sint preciossimae, facillime tamen perduntur, ac difficillime restituitur: sapiens existimandus non est, qui famae, que neque restitui potest semel smissa, & qua nihil habet homo preciosius, non multo diligentius consulendum putat quam pecuniae, aut etiam vitae. Potest etiam tribus dumtaxat, aut quattuor partibus confici collection: si vel confirmatio, vel expolitio, vel utraque omittitur. (qtd. In Craig 624).  (back)
  2. For further details about the versions and popularity of The Kalender, see Driver’s “When a Miscellany is not a Miscellany.” For a detailed history of the various permutations and lines of transmission of English translations of The Kalendar, see Oskar Sommers’ wonderful forewards to The Kalender of Shepherdes: The Edition of Paris 1503 in PhotographicFacsimile which contains editions of the Paris 1503 and the 1506 Pynson. You can find the full book at Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=tDQMAAAAYAAJ&oe=UTF-8) or at the Internet Archive (http://archive.org/details/kalendershepher00praegoog).  (back)
  3. Though I have not yet had a chance to look at the two Wynkyn de Worde editions (STC 22409 and 22411), I am fairly certain their translations are very similar to the Robert Copeland translations found in other editions. What I desperately want to check, however, is the second Pynson edition of [1517?] (STC 22409.7) to see if this translation is unique to the 1506.  (back)
  4. I have yet to check other editions, but the 1506 French edition does not include a similar line, and the Copland English translation that returned to the French originals and became the most standard English translation in later editions does not include the reference to “good names” either.  (back)
  5. The 1503 Paris edition, sometimes (questionably) attributed to Andrew Barclay, does contain a very different translation of what the Powell translation renders “loketh for woll on an urchyns back.” As best I can tell, the 1503 Paris edition says “rayssyns aboue the thornys.”  (back)
  6. I do hope to check out the later Pynson (STC 22409.7) to see if his later edition of the Kalender includes the line on “good names” in the future, but have not yet been able to do so. It is possible, that with the seeming popularity of the subsequent translation, that Pynson might have changed this section by either removing the lines about “good names” or replacing them with the line about the unprofitability of slander, but my hope is that he kept his original and added the second. If anyone has access to a copy of the STC 22409.7, I would love to hear from you, and please contact me.  (back)
  7. In this post, I only sketch out a few of these possibilities, but intend to flesh them out further in later additions to this series.  (back)
  8. Drawing from the separate L’art de Bien Viure et de Bien Mourir (Ars Moriendi) from 1492, the 1503 The Kalendayr incorporated the Ars Moriendi’s description of Hell, and soon became a standard addition to almost all editions, in both French and English, of The Kalender of Shepherds.  (back)
Craig additionally details that Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique “apparently borrowed the idea. And condensed and adapted” a passage from Juan Louis Vives’s De Conscribendis Epistolis (1531), which says,
Sapientis est famae suae longe diligentius, quam opibus suis, non minvus vero diligenter quam vitae consulare. Minus siquidem damni, & incommode accipit, qui pecuniam, aut etiam amissa sarciri potest, fama semel amissa, in integrum resituitur nunquam. Et vita quidem corpris, quum certos a natura terminus acceperit, in longum tempus extendi nequit…. Quod si homines iis rebus maxime timere videmus, quae cum sint preciossimae, facillime tamen perduntur, ac difficillime restituitur: sapiens existimandus non est, qui famae, que neque restitui potest semel smissa, & qua nihil habet homo preciosius, non multo diligentius consulendum putat quam pecuniae, aut etiam vitae. Potest etiam tribus dumtaxat, aut quattuor partibus confici collection: si vel confirmatio, vel expolitio, vel utraque omittitur. (qtd. In Craig 624).
For further details about the versions and popularity of The Kalender, see Driver’s “When a Miscellany is not a Miscellany.” For a detailed history of the various permutations and lines of transmission of English translations of The Kalendar, see Oskar Sommers’ wonderful forewards to The Kalender of Shepherdes: The Edition of Paris 1503 in PhotographicFacsimile which contains editions of the Paris 1503 and the 1506 Pynson. You can find the full book at Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=tDQMAAAAYAAJ&oe=UTF-8) or at the Internet Archive (http://archive.org/details/kalendershepher00praegoog).
Though I have not yet had a chance to look at the two Wynkyn de Worde editions (STC 22409 and 22411), I am fairly certain their translations are very similar to the Robert Copeland translations found in other editions. What I desperately want to check, however, is the second Pynson edition of [1517?] (STC 22409.7) to see if this translation is unique to the 1506.
I have yet to check other editions, but the 1506 French edition does not include a similar line, and the Copland English translation that returned to the French originals and became the most standard English translation in later editions does not include the reference to “good names” either.
The 1503 Paris edition, sometimes (questionably) attributed to Andrew Barclay, does contain a very different translation of what the Powell translation renders “loketh for woll on an urchyns back.” As best I can tell, the 1503 Paris edition says “rayssyns aboue the thornys.”
I do hope to check out the later Pynson (STC 22409.7) to see if his later edition of the Kalender includes the line on “good names” in the future, but have not yet been able to do so. It is possible, that with the seeming popularity of the subsequent translation, that Pynson might have changed this section by either removing the lines about “good names” or replacing them with the line about the unprofitability of slander, but my hope is that he kept his original and added the second. If anyone has access to a copy of the STC 22409.7, I would love to hear from you, and please contact me.
In this post, I only sketch out a few of these possibilities, but intend to flesh them out further in later additions to this series.
Drawing from the separate L’art de Bien Viure et de Bien Mourir (Ars Moriendi) from 1492, the 1503 The Kalendayr incorporated the Ars Moriendi’s description of Hell, and soon became a standard addition to almost all editions, in both French and English, of The Kalender of Shepherds.
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Posted in Tangents, William Shakespeare Tagged Representation of Hell, early modern, Shakespeare, Othello, Envy, Source Study, Kalender of Shepherdes, Kalendar of Shepherds

“Let it turn to something else”: Conservative Ideology and the Reshaping of American Masculinity in Red Dawn from 1984 to 2012

Growing up and developing my own sense of identity through the products of popular culture in the Reagan era, I must admit that Red Dawn (1984) played an important role not only in defining the imaginative landscape of my six year old self, but also, I should think, in helping define and in producing my sense of the world and my place within it. While my Midwestern parents tried to forbid the violent and PG-13-rated product of the Cold War, I eagerly watched at friends and other relatives houses as a band of Midwestern high school students took on the invading communists shouting their high school motto “Wolverines!”

red-dawn-original

The film was formative in my early understanding not only of communism and the Cold War, but also my developing sense of masculine identity. The scene in which Soviet paratroopers descend upon and subsequently shoot up a rural American high school fostered a sense not only that these communist forces were evil but also that they could strike at any time and in any place. I needed to be prepared. So I would imagine myself, B-B gun in hand running around the Midwestern woods imagining myself ambushing and engaging in firefights with Soviet, Nicaraguan, and Cuban forces. Modeling my play after the Jed Eckerts and John Rambos of eighties popular culture, I unwittingly imbibed, performed and replicated pop culture’s understanding not only of foreign policy but also of what it means to be a “man.”

Years later when designing and teaching a course called “I Love the 80s(?): Pop Culture in the Reagan Era” at the University of Virginia, I considered including Red Dawn on my syllabus but ended up opting for another popular 80s action film, Rambo: First Blood Part II. As my course was primarily a writing course for first year students, I thought the less complicated and more exaggerated Stallone film an easier way to get students to recognize how politics and cultural beliefs and practices shape and are shaped by popular culture. To be honest, I think I kept Red Dawn from the syllabus primarily to maintain the special nostalgic place it still had in my heart.

Needless to say, when I heard that a remake was being made for a 2010 release, I both groaned and smiled. Personally, I was excited to nostalgically re-experience the joy, fear, and fascination that had created such an impression that it sent me to the woods of my parents’ half-wooded ten acre home to train against the immanent communist invasion for years afterwards. Academically, I wondered how they would translate the conflicts of the Cold War into a post-Cold War world, and thought that the very things I loved about the film from the ages of six to thirteen would anger me now.

My first thought was that the producers would translate the ridiculous idea of a Soviet and Cuban land invasion into something involving a terrorist organization. I was only moderately surprised upon discovery that the enemy was going to be Chinese rather than Al Qaeda. With the delayed release until 2012, I was more surprised when it was reported that in the delay the producers backed off from making its original invading force Chinese and opting instead for the North Koreans. According to some sources, the studios feared that making the Chinese the enemies within the film would mean that they would lose a large Chinese audience market. The confrontation between late capitalism and communism could never be so poignant in its contradiction. For fear of losing revenue from audiences in communist China, the capitalist producers went to great lengths to CGI Chinese icons and images from every scene and replaced them with North Korean ones. Communism must be feared and battled only insofar as that engagement does not mean financial losses.

The change to the remake’s script additionally had the unintentional consequence of implying the interchangeability of Asian peoples as many of the same actors and actresses of the original cut magically metamorphosed nationalities and different peoples with a little CGI magic that swapped Chinese stars and flags with North Korean ones. Since this aspect of the remake made the most waves, I will not reiterate those arguments here, and one can find some excellent discussions and posts on this subject HERE and about the anti-Asian Tweets the film expired HERE.

Instead, I would like to focus this post on an aspect that to my knowledge has not been addressed about the 2012 remake’s relationship to the 1984 original by exploring the shifting representation of masculinity from the Reagan era to today through the lens of the two films. By focusing on the characteristics of the traditional cinematic father as it changes and morphs from the 1984 to 2012, I argue that the father as represented in the original becomes split between Tom Eckert and his eldest son Jed Eckert in the remake. By focusing on the changes made to the character of Tom Eckert, we can see how conservative beliefs about parenting and masculinity inform conservative understandings of the threat of communism and the dangers offered by “liberal” parenting to American identity and masculinity. In both films, the Eckert family contrasts with the family of the local Mayor. While differing in the extent of their vilification of Mayor Barnes in the 1984 and Mayor Jenkins in the 2012, we can see how conservative notions of liberal and conservative fathers play into ideas of both American masculinity and parenthood. When we view the way in which the remake shapes its sense of masculinity and fatherhood, we can also see how the 2012 film perpetuates a conservative understanding of masculinity and uses that understanding to criticize what Glenn Beck and other popular conservatives represent as the dangers inherent in liberal parenting as they relate to the perceived fears about the Obama administration.

Perhaps partially informed by my own nostalgic relationship with the original, when I watched the remake film for the first time the other night, I was struck in particular by the way the two films offer very different Eckert fathers. In the 1984 version, the two main characters’ father, Mr. Eckert, played by the incomparable Harry Dean Stanton, does not get much screen time but casts a much larger shadow than his few minutes of screen time should produce. He represents a type of father typical of 80s popular culture. Stoic, intractable, and with hints that he might have been emotionally and physically abusive, Tom Eckert represents a complicated representation of masculinity and fatherhood. Unlike the 2012 remake, we do not really see the 1984 Tom Eckert much before the invasion, and, instead, only really see his character later when the Eckert boys find him interred in a local reeducation camp.

When the boys find Tom at the camp, they have the following exchange with their interred father:

Tom: Boys!
Matt: Daddy. Dad.
Tom: Don’t talk. Don’t say anything. Let me look at ya. I knew I was right. I knew it. I knew you were alive. I was tough on both of you, and I did things that made you hate me sometimes. You understand now, don’t you?
Jed: Why are you here, dad? What’d you do?
Tom: Doesn’t matter. One way or another, for one reason or another, we’re all gone. It’s all gone. Remember. Remember when you used to go in the park and play, and I used to put you two on the swings? Both of you were so damn little.
Jed: I remember. I remember all of it.
Tom: Well, I won’t be there to pick you up when you fall now. Both of you have to take care of each other now.


Avenge Me

Red Dawn

— MOVIECLIPS.com

The cryptic “did things that made you hate me sometimes,” while not an outright admission of abuse, does represent a type of fatherhood common in the films of the eighties. Tom’s statement here reveals the supposed value in a “tough” parenting style that prepares children (or most typically boys) for the hard truths of life and reality. In Red Dawn, Tom frames his tough model of fatherhood as preparing his two sons to face the threats of communism. As I will discuss below, nostalgia for this “outdated” and “traditional” model of fatherhood survives in contemporary conservative discourses on the “weakening” of American ideals and American power.

The film reiterates this type of stoic fatherhood several moments later when Jed and Matt learn their mother has been killed. This type of fatherhood often comes fused with beliefs about proscriptions against men crying, and such is the case for the Eckerts of the 1984 Red Dawn. When Jed asks about his mother and Tom silently acknowledges that she has been killed, Jed begins to weep, to which Mr. Eckert responds, “You can’t afford to be crying now. I don’t want either one of you to cry for me again. Don’t ever do it. Not as long as you live.” The Jed Eckert (Patrick Swayze) of the 1984 film does show emotion and here and elsewhere he does break into tears, but those tears are continually questioned as the film polarizes the emotions of sadness and anger, emphasizing the transferability of the two. Jed takes his father’s advice on tears seriously and Tom’s prohibition on crying becomes a key plot point in the Wolverines’ decision to increase the frequency and ferocity of their attacks.

In the aftermath of Tom Eckert’s later execution by firing squad, Jed shows that he has taken his father’s advice to heart as he beseeches his fellow Wolverines to convert their sorrow into anger.[ref]Don’t cry! Hold it back! Let it turn to something else. Just let it turn to something else. Okay? Listen to me. Listen! Don’t cry. Don’t you ever cry again as long as you live. As long as you live, never do it! You hear me![/ref]

While the scene makes me cringe looking back on the way in which Jed’s speech reinforced my six-year-olds belief that “boys don’t cry,” Jed, like my six-year-old self, takes Tom Eckert’s words to heart. The “something else” Jed wants his fellow Wolverines to turn their sorrow into, of course, is retaliatory violence. The same dynamic turning from sadness to anger surfaces in the reeducation camp scene in another way as Tom turns from love to aggression. Such proposed transitions are commonplace amongst pop psychology and pop culture which shape gender norms. Especially during the Reagan era, to be a “man,” these films tell us, must perform a stoic masculinity.

In addition to the prohibition against tears and crying, the scene at the reeducation camp includes the following exchange:

Jed: Dad, I love you.
Tom: I know you do, son. I love you too.

The moment is given greater emphasis and power precisely because one gleans from Tom’s character and from Harry Dean Stanton’s delivery the rarity of this sort of exchange in the Eckert household; a moment of tenderness that stands out because of its infrequency. But this moment only lasts very briefly and turns towards anger and aggression as the Wolverines make their way from the camp when Tom famously screams out “Boys! Avenge me! Avenge me!” Tom turns from a brief expression of love to the something else of vengeance, and, as we see in the “turn it to something else” scene, this fatherly instruction becomes key to Jed’s transformation from boy to revolutionary and communist fighting man.

Understandable enough given the context within the film, it should still be recognized that this product of popular culture also codes its gender types in situations far different from its own. This model of emotionless and borderline abusive form of masculinity dominated the popular culture of the Reagan era. The codes about the necessity of turning sorrow into violent anger, while suitable in the context of Red Dawn’s “World War III,” becomes problematic when audience members, like myself at six years old, begin to equate crying with weakness and are prompted to “turn it into something else,” to respond to sorrow with anger. These issues become more pronounced when one compares the 1984 Tom Eckert to the Tom Eckert of 2012. We encounter, in the 2012 remake, a very different Tom Eckert and a different model of fatherhood.

In the remake, the Eckert father transforms from a seemingly distant, stoic, and angry man to a loving and supportive small-town cop. While part of the change might depend on the fact that we do not see the 1984 Tom until after his arrest, the two stand out as very different models of fatherhood. From the very first scene, Eckert watches as his “cowboy” younger son, Matt Eckert (Josh Peck), loses a football game for his refusal to take instruction and guidance from his football coach. The visibly upset father Tom Eckert (Brett Cullen) storms away from the field and we half expect this scene to develop later into a scene where Tom confronts Matt about his inability to take orders, but that is not what the writers give us. Instead, as Tom leaves for work after a mysterious power outage that we later learn was the first wave of the North Korean invasion, we get a decidedly tender moment.

When Matt asks Tom if he saw the game, Tom responds with a surprising,

Yes, sir. I saw it all. I’m proud of you. You played your hardest. That’s what matters. They’re lucky to have you.

On the surface, this Tom Eckert stands out starkly in contrast with Stanton’s Tom. Whereas the 1984 Tom promoted a sense of stoic manliness and alludes to his history as a demanding and potentially abusive parent, this Tom is encouraging. We do not get the sense, at least from the way he interacts with his younger son, Matt, that this Tom would never need to apologize for being “tough” or for “doing things that made [Matt] hate [Tom] sometimes.” But this scene and the 2012 remakes’ version of fatherhood is not quite as different as it might initially appear. The scene is complicated by the double framework offered through its camera work, as the focus is dominated, not by Tom and Matt Eckert, but by the older of the Eckert boys, Jed Eckert (Chris Hemsworth).

Tom and Jed as Matt's Dual Daddies in Red Dawn (2012)

Tom and Jed as Matt’s Dual Daddies in Red Dawn (2012)

Jed’s character undergoes an important change from 1984 to 2012. No longer the blue-collar gas-station worker of the 1984 Swayze character, the 2012 Jed is a trained and experienced United States Marine. Most likely changed to provide some plausibility to the idea that untrained high-school students could take on an invading army, the change also has the unintended consequence of shifting the emphasis away from a father-sons dynamic to one of a sibling rivalry that resembles the dynamics of a traditional father-son relationship. Jed, the older brother, takes on some of the aspects assigned to Harry Dean Stanton’s Tom. Whereas Swayze’s Jed has his own father-son dynamic to work through, Hemsworth’s Jed is already the film’s paragon of masculinity, stoic, and trained and prepared for combat.

It is through the double framing of Tom’s words to Matt about the football game, that the 2012 Red Dawn manifests a layer of complication I can only read as related to contemporary conservative thoughts about ideas of what it means to be a father and of proper parenting techniques. The film makes it clear, however, through its attention to Jed’s quizzical and disapproving face, that Tom’s encouragement is not the proper reaction to Matt’s antics on the field. The camera work centers the focus not on the exchange between Tom and Matt but upon Jed’s reaction to it, and we are led to believe that something about this style of parenting is doing a disservice to the reckless Matty.

This scene navigates some pretty complicated waters. I imagine the creators struggled with how to create a father who did not conform to the “tough” stereotypical father of 1980s film while simultaneously retaining some of the dynamics of that conventional treatment. What we see here is a type of tempered father figure whose liberal parenting style is not outright criticized but which we see framed through the eyes of an older brother who more closely resembles an older model of fatherhood.

To me, this exchange and the splitting of these two different father figures embodies the types of conservative critiques of liberal parenting offered by such conservative figures as Glenn Beck and Bill O’Reilly. For them, the cultural shift away from the competitive spirit that distinguishes winners and losers to one that recognizes the value of participation. For Beck, liberals oppose the competition that makes late capitalism so grand and wonderful. And while having absolutely no direct relationship with Red Dawn, Beck’s self-described rant offers a similar convergence of parenting and governance that I’m tracing in the differences between the different father types of the two Red Dawns. While this has been a persistent theme in Beck’s radio shows, television shows, and webcasts, look at the way similar issues converge in Beck’s reaction to an Obama speech on December 7, 2011 (the relevant part starts at the 2 minute 18 second mark).

How many of our kids—do we look at our kids and say, “Oh, hello. Hello little orphan kid. I love you so much. I just want you to strive to be kind of mediocre. Kind of strive to be just kind of in the center. You know what you should really do? You should—you should practice really hard and you should run your heart out and work so hard and maybe end up at the finish somewhere in the middle of the pack. That’s what you should do. You know what you should do? Work really hard and someday—someday—if you work really hard, you’ll be able to achieve in school maybe a C, and you can get Cs from here to shining C. That’s what America is all about, little Billy.” No! You know who says that to their kids? Anyone who is still giving their kids one of these. [Holds up participation trophy] Participation. Oh, you’re participating. I hate these. I hate them. Here’s what I’d like you to do right now. This is the great thing about GBTV, because you can pause it. I want you to go into your room—the kids’ room—especially if they’re there, and, if not, wait until they come home, because I want your kids to go, “Mom, dad, what are you doing? What are you doing?” I want you to say this, “Where are your participation ribbons? There they are!” Partcpation. Participation. Then, go in and—participation, yeah. “These participation trophies, little Billy?” [Billy’s fake sobbing] “Yeah, yeah, yeah. They don’t mean anything. You know participation? That means you showed up. You gotta do more than that. And your little participation trophy? “Come on, little Billy, come on.” “But daddy, you’re scaring me.” “I know. Daddy’s getting really scary now, isn’t he? Come on. Come on, little Billy, we’re going to go into the garage and here’s your little participation trophy, and were going to put it right here. See? And this is what happens to participation trophies. This is what we do. We don’t believe in participation trophies. We don’t do that. I mean. Unless you want to grow up to be a Marxist. Because that would be great—if you want to be a Marxist.

Ignoring the bizarre dynamics that shift from the “little orphan boy” to “little Billy” whose father goes into Billy’s room to collect and subsequently destroy his ribbons and trophies in the family garage, Beck links fatherhood, the cultural (and, in his eyes, liberal) recognition of participation rather than winning and losing, and Marxist ideologies. For Beck, fatherhood plays an important role in making a “good” American citizen, and, while that may to some extent be true, he also bizarrely proposes that liberal parenting methods plot the country on a course headed for communism. For Beck (at least since 2008), the real danger of “Progressivism” shows itself in the election of Barack Obama, who, to the conspiracy-theorist mind, embodies a “Marxist” mentality. To close his half-comedic bit, Beck turns from the dangers of participation trophies to the dangers he thinks Obama comedically embodies, pointing to Obama’s head photoshopped onto Chairman Mao’s body.

Beck’s constitutes an interesting shift in focus from the representations of Soviets the American public acquired from the popular culture of the Reagan era. While not foregrounded in Red Dawn, other Cold War films taught us that the Soviets were often stoic to the point of sociopathic. Look, for example at the sociopathic Lieutenant Colonel Podovsky (Steven Berkoff) and mindless Sergeant Yushin (Voyo Goric) of Rambo: First Blood Pt II or Drago, the unemotional boxing machine, of Rocky IV, whose implacable emotional callousness stands in contradistinction to the heroes who embody an American emotional individualism promoted as the benefits of freedom that give America its competitive edge against machine-like Soviets. In Beck’s imagining of a communist threat to American values, the “Marxists” no longer retain their monolithic, sociopathic strength, but, instead, constitute a type of weak masculinity which he identifies and attacks as a hallmark of modern American liberalism.

Part of the difference is the change in “enemy” since the conclusion of the Cold War. Asian communists in pop culture have long played second fiddle to their Soviet counterparts at least since the Reagan era. The Soviets were often represented as hardened and sociopathic soldiers, Asians, however, were represented as, at best, “softer” enemies, and, at worst, as animal-like beasts of burden for the USSR. Look, for example, at Rambo: First Blood Part II, where the Vietnamese soldiers become the lackies using primitive methods of torture before the arrival of the coolly-rational and calculating machine-like Soviet supervisor, Podovsky. The same dynamic can be seen today in conservative responses to communism. Whereas the Soviets were represented as a powerful monolithic force that needed to be strongly confronted in order to be defeated, Asian communist countries were and still are represented as more of a dangerous nuisance (especially odd given the American defeat in Vietnam). This legacy continues today where conservative commentators like Beck, no longer having the Soviets to oppose, now see countries like North Korea as a source of derisive mockery rather than as a real threat to America and to an American way of life. In the clip posted above, both China and Obama paradoxically become both threat and source of humor in their juxtaposition. The real threat, in this Beck bit, is the decay of a strong competitive American spirit that he thinks has been weakened by liberal parenting and weak fathers.

In the remake of Red Dawn, Tom does not wholly embody the type of weak father Beck envisions, but his character is informed by a liberal sensibility. Despite the changes to Tom’s character, one can still detect a vein of conservative notions of fatherhood beneath the surface of Red Dawn (2012). The remake goes to some lengths to imply that Tom’s parenting style changed between the raising of his older son, Jed, and his younger son, Matt. The mother of the 1984 original which is mentioned several times and disappears without much fanfare, has disappeared entirely from the 2012 remake. As we learn later, Jed left for the service as a response to their mother’s death six years prior, leaving Matt, in Jed’s words, “right when [Matt] needed [Jed] the most.” The implication is that the Tom that raised the tougher and responsible Jed changed his approach to parenting Matt after the death of his mother. While somewhat speculative, reading the exchange and camera work about the football game makes much more sense in this context. It protects Tom from accusations that he might be the type of “soft” parent of the order Glenn Beck disparages.

From this point of view, although Tom Eckert stands as a figure of social authority (he is a cop!), and, from what we see in the remainder of the film, as a good father, his interaction with Matt concerning the football game represents a parenting type that conservatives like Beck not only associate with progressives and Marxism but that also reveal the weakening of America and constitutes a threat to American values and an American way of life. As Beck implies in his participation trophies rant, Tom’s type of encouragement weakens America, and, somehow, embodies the threat of “Marxist” takeover. Even if Tom’s parenting style is complicated by the fact of his dead wife, Tom’s relationship with Matt is tainted by his lack of emphasis on “winning.” Tom’s talk about the football game constitutes a type of participation trophy for which figures like Beck have such ire.

At the same time, the 2012 remake does not fully represent Tom as a “weak liberal” father despite his exchange with Matty. Instead, Red Dawn (2012) reserves that role for the local Mayor. While the character of the Mayor appears in the 1984 version of the film, the 2012 remake shifts the emphasis to reflect conservative ideology of another order. If his eldest son Jed constitutes an opposing father figure to the young Matt in the course of the film, Mayor Jenkins critiques a more exaggerated form of “Progressive” fatherhood that opposes both Tom and Jed.

Brought to the family cabin in the Pacific Northwestern wilderness along with Mayor Jenkins (Michael Beach), father to one of the other boys camped out in the mountains, Daryl (Connor Cruise), to convince the youths to surrender. Both Tom Eckert and Mayor Jenkins embody two different types of fatherhood as well as competing forms of American domestic authority. Tom Eckert, the cop, and Mayor Jenkins, the local politician, offer polarized and competing responses to their foreign attackers. While both stand as figures of authority, where Tom encourages resistance, Jenkins encourages submission. This becomes apparent when both offer speeches to the “boys” hiding from the search parties of the North Korean prefect, Captain Cho (Will Yun Lee).

The shifty Mayor Bates from Red Dawn (1984)
Michael Beach on set with Chris Hemsworth during the filming of Red Dawn (2012).

Mayor Jenkins constitutes a radical reworking of the character of Mayor Bates (Lane Smith) from the 1984 original. As opposed to the ineffectual and passively traitorous Mayor Jenkins, Mayor Bates plays a much more active role in the 1984 film and in the subjugation of American citizens to the foreign oppressors within it. The earlier Red Dawn Mayor actively aids the communist forces both in smoothing the regime change as well as actively engages in ferreting out dissenters and the radical violent oppositional forces like the Eckert family.

We do not see a similar collaborative spirit in the 2012 version and, although he does work to support the occupying government, he does so in a much more limited way. The remake makes it clear that neither Eckert nor Jenkins gave away the location of the mountain cabin, but the suit-wearing Jenkins contrasts starkly to the police-uniformed Eckert as Cho leads them from a Hummer to convince their children to surrender. Eckert is visibly injured whereas Jenkins appears unharmed and more confused and shaken than injured.

Mayor Jenkins is given the bullhorn first, and he calls to the concealed youths,

Boys! It’s Mayor Jenkins. Captain Cho here is the acting prefect of this district. Now he says you seriously injured some of his men and he’s given me his word. If you turn yourselves in, no one’s gonna be hurt. Okay? …Boys? …Daryl? …Son? I’d like you to come home.

The linguistic space of the new government’s declaration that Cho is the “prefect” of this “district” already informs and shapes Jenkins’ speech as he treats the hidden “boys” as criminals to this new system of governance. For him, “home” remains a place that still exists and that one can return to. While not the smarmy and obsequious Mayor Bates of the 1984 Red Dawn, Mayor Jenkins’ speech is enough for Matt Eckert to declare “he can’t help us. He’s helping them.”

Compare this speech to Tom Eckert’s speech that follows once it becomes clear that Jenkins’ has not had the desired effect. Eckert takes the bullhorn.

Boys! If you’re out there and you can hear me, listen up! A tough situation all the way around. A lot of tough choices. I love you both. I hope you know that. What I’m going to ask you to do will be very difficult, but I want you boys to do what I would do. I want you to go to war and stop this piece of shit. Or die tryin’.

Despite the “softened” image of the father from the 1984 to the 2012 versions, Tom Eckert, like his predecessor, encourages, if not demands, a fight. While not quite as powerful as Harry Dean Stanton shouting “AVENGE ME,” Brett Cullen’s final speech to his sons promotes insurgency against the foreign oppressors. Denied the powerful exchange of Harry Dean Stanton’s Tom and his sons, Brett Cullen’s Tom only speaks to them through a bullhorn.

For Mr. Eckert of the original, the end does not come immediately after his demand to be avenged. Instead, as a result of the Wolverines’ continued attacks on Soviet troops, Mr. Eckert becomes one of the townspeople executed by firing squad in retaliation for those attacks. Eckert leads an evocative rendition of “America the Beautiful” just before the Soviet machine guns tear through the bodies of the crowd. His final act of defiance comes through a form of patriotism that might not work as effectively in Hollywood today as it did in the Reagan era. In this version, Mayor Bates looks like a co-conspirator in the war crime. Instead, Tom Eckert’s final speech and his execution come in the same scene, but Mayor Jenkins is not blamed for Tom’s death. Tom’s final moment occurs not on a firing line and singing “America the Beautiful” as the collaborator and responsible Mayor Bates looks on finally disgusted by his own actions, but occurs as a direct message to his sons hidden in the surrounding brush after Mayor Jenkins delivers a much more ineffectual request. It is the weak collaboration that defines Mayor Jenkins and distinguishes his character from his 1984 counterpart. It is also this weak collaboration that links the remake’s Mayor Jenkins to the conservative fringe’s paranoid fears and conspiracy theories about President Obama.

The remake shies away from the retaliatory violence of the original, or, rather, avoids the issue by presenting a single scene where the Wolverines interrupt the execution of a single townsperson who has helped them directly. Unlike the firing squads which serve as retaliatory punishment for the Wolverine attacks of the 1984 version, the 2012 Red Dawn stifles the messy complications of the first. The 1984 Red Dawn contains a telling scene where several members of the Wolverines question whether their own actions as makeshift revolutionaries (Oedipally?) result in their father’s deaths. For the 2012 remake, those complications are squelched entirely as the occupying force and their collaborating Mayor never quite achieves the same level of villainy as their 1984 counterparts. Even Tom Eckert’s execution comes from his direct defiance of and opposition to Cho rather tha in retaliation for the actions led by his sons.

Both films represent retaliatory violence not only as a patriotic duty, but also as the proper duty of a son, but with a major and, from a certain angle, baffling shift in emphasis. In the 2012 version, unlike the 80s version where the Wolverines are already engaged in attacks against the foreign invaders by the time the boys encounter Tom, the 2012 version makes its Tom’s final speech integral to the group’s decision to fight back. Such a shift in emphasis would not be as important had the remake version not metamorphosed the leader of the rag-tag band of blue-collar and high-school boys from the gas-station employee of Swayze’s Jed to the battle-hardened and ready Jed of Chris Hemsworth.

I cannot help but think the contrast between the white Tom Eckert and the black Mayor Jenkins is informed by conservative ideologies and politics where conservative anxieties about the supposed appeasement of China by liberals and President Barack Obama emerge in contrast to some sort of white conservative mythology of standing against the communist menace and threat. Whereas Jenkins encourages his child and his friends to surrender as a way to survive, Eckert uses this moment to demand resistance, and this moment of resistance results in his immediate execution. Similar to the Hollywood disaster movies rampant even prior to Obama’s election, it seems like only a black leader can preside during a time of crisis. As local mayor, of course, the responsibility for the attack is not laid at Jenkins’ feet, but the conservative concerns over the Obama administration’s supposed submission to Chinese authority bleeds though nonetheless.

In contrast to Mayor Bates, who idly stands by to witness the mass execution of Americans for the assaults launched by the Wolverines and who offers his own personal assistance to help ferret out the Eckert boys, Mayor Jenkins does little onscreen to suggest his willful collaboration. While he does appease his new foreign oppressors, Jenkins does so more for the love of his son Daryl and out of confusion and fear.

While his son, Daryl, and another African American Wolverine, Danny mitigate the racism of Jenkins’ submissiveness to foreign authority, the implication is that Obama and his administration willingly kowtows to Chinese influence and domination. Even as it includes the two black youths in the Wolverines, making their group much more diverse than that of its 80s collective of white Midwesterners, the film still establishes white masculinity as its model of American masculinity. While Daryl willingly concedes to go ahead with a terrorist bombing of a propaganda rally despite the fact that his father is unexpectedly in attendance, it is still the self-sacrificing, military trained, emotionally stoic Jed Eckert who stands out as the prototype of American masculinity within the world of the film.

Ooops! Looks like an all-white group of Wolverines in this promo poster. Sorry, Daryl!

Ooops! Looks like an all-white group of Wolverines in this promo poster. Sorry, Daryl!

Jed Eckert takes on some aspects of the original’s father figure. Somewhat distant and jaded by his experiences as a Marine during his tour in Iraq, Jed absorbs some of the aspects given to Harry Dean Stanton’s Mr. Eckert. It is Jed how criticizes his younger brother for his “cowboy” mentality and play during the opening scene’s football game. It is Jed who appears emotionally detached and aloof. It is Jed who encourages the Wolverines to form and fight against the foreign invaders. It is Jed for whom eliciting an “I’m proud of you” becomes a major turning point in the plot of the film, and can only occur just before his death.

Mr. Eckert’s character contrasts starkly with Tom Eckert’s. Whereas Tom immediately tells Matt that he is proud of and supports him, Jed calls out his brother for his selfish play and arrogance. This becomes a major dynamic between Jed and Matt through the remainder of the film, as Matt learns the value of working as a team and working together as a group. While we do not get a similar scene in the 1984 original, we can see more parallels between the 2012 Jed and the 1984 Mr. Eckert than between the two films’ Tom Eckerts.[ref]This brings me back to one last point about Jed Eckert’s character that relates back to the controversies surrounding the producer’s decisions to swap the nationalities of the invading forces. Instead of the more boyish Patrick Swayze of the original, Jed is played by Chris Hemsworth. The figure who seems to represent the film’s paradigm of American masculinity, who reiterates throughout that he is a United States marine, and who takes on part of the traditional role as the distant and demanding father, is played not by some American actor but by an Australian. While not of the same order and magnitude as the interchangeable Asian swap, I find it interesting that no one comments on the peculiarity of this less publicized and apparent nationality swap. Instead of the Houston-born Swayze, we get the Australian-born Hemsworth. Now I do not want to go Glenn Beck goofy in reversing and equating the racist paradigms used against “others” and reapplying them to how whiteness or “Americanness” suffers the same fate, but, in a film so steeped in issues of American identity and masculinity, I find the casting choice almost as interesting as the way in which its dynamics are ignored. The unacknowledged problem is that this choice does resemble the swapping of national identities found in that other switch, even if it has less racist undertones.[/ref]

The remake’s Jed offers a nod to Swayze’s “let it turn to something else” speech when Hemsworth tells his brother Matt to “rub some dirt on it” after he is responsible for the death of fellow Wolverine, Greg (Julian Alcaraz). In this version, however, we have no corollary offered by Jed’s father. Whereas Swayze’s Jed launches into a critique of crying that reiterates his father’s earlier prohibition against it, Hemsworth’s Jed offers this advice based on his own experience of warfare in Iraq. Whereas Swayze’s Jed turns crying into “something else” per his father’s instruction, Hemsworth’s Jed is already stoic, trained, and prepared.

The differences in the two Jeds and their relationships to crying speak to important cultural changes embodied in the changes to Jed’s character and as his new role as a competing father figure for the younger brother Matt. Whereas we see the 1984 Jed Eckert breaking down into tears both in the exchange with his father, Tom Eckert at the reeducation camp and again much later (snot bubble!), we do not get the same from the Hemsworth Jed. The closest Hemsworth’s character comes to expressing any emotions whatsoever is when he tears up upon witnessing his father’s execution. It is Jed whose telling Matt that he is “proud” of him towards the film’s conclusion that becomes a major emotional turning point signifying Matt’s assumption of manhood. It is Jed’s words that Matt repeats at the end of the film when leading troops on an assault against the local internment camp after Jed’s eventual death.

At the same time, however, the fate of the Jenkins family within the 2012 remake relates to its critique of American liberalism and of the Obama administration. Not only does Mayor Jenkins become the collaborating agent of political authority, but his son, despite his separation from his father’s stance throughout the film, seems to suffer for his relationship. In the original, Mayor Bates’s son, Daryl, is knowingly forced to ingest a tracking device that allows joint Cuban and Russian troops to locate the Wolverine encampment. In the remake, Daryl is stabbed by a Soviet Spetsnaz and unknowingly gives away their position that leads to Jed’s death.

The rewriting of Daryl’s tracking and fate has at least two interesting consequences for the 2012 Red Dawn. The first is that it results in an incredibly bizarre moment in which Jed’s potential yet underdeveloped love interest, Toni Walsh (Adrianne Palicki), grieving for Jed’s death, charges Daryl with her AK, shouting “You killed Jed!” While Daryl does not suffer the same fate as his 1984 counterpart, who Jed executes for being a forced yet knowing traitor to the group, Toni’s threat, even if only briefly, contains the suggestion that the unwitting bearer of a tracking device deserves the same fate.

Instead of being summarily executed, the remake Daryl chooses to be left behind in a heroic, if suicidal, act. Asking for his friend Robert’s SAW, Daryl redeems himself for his unintentional role in their ambush, but he also seems to be punished for his role as his father’s son. Whereas the relationship between Mayor Bates and Daryl Bates appear more related in their familial ability to sell out their friends and fellow Americans, the defining logic, once rewritten in the 2012 version, appears to create an unusual scenario with a potential political message and agenda. Just as Mayor Jenkins does not directly aid the occupying government (at least not onscreen) as Mayor Bates does, Daryl Jenkins does not directly and knowingly assist the invading troops in the way Daryl Bates does.

Sorry, Daryl. I know you agreed to kill your father, and didn't know you were being tracked, but we have to leave you behind.

Sorry, Daryl. I know you agreed to kill your father, and didn’t know you were being tracked, but we have to leave you behind.

If we can read Mayor Jenkins as an embodiment of conservative fears of the Obama administration’s complicity with China, Daryl, too, becomes linked to this motif through his familial ties. Daryl, unwittingly tagged with a subversive device becomes the agent through which the communists track and attack, killing the film’s paragon of American masculinity, Jed Eckert. Daryl, like the paranoid fantasies of Glenn Beck, is infected with an odd blend of liberalism and “Marxism” both by blood and by the injected tracking device. Rather than becoming a traitor to the group, Daryl redeems himself yet again by offering himself rather than his previously offered father as a sacrifice for the group, but, like Daryl Bates, the punishment for his allegiances and actions result in his expulsion from the group and, presumably, his death. From a certain angle, Daryl can be seen as what Glenn Beck likes to describe as the “useful idiots” of progressivism and ‘Marxism,’ which Beck uses as a blanket term for what he sees as the unfortunate victims of liberal ideals who are really unwitting agents for a “Marxist” takeover of America.

If such conservative ideology does lie behind the 2012 remake, it tempers its critique of liberalism by making their agents not actively complicit in the communist takeover. The Jenkinses become less and un-willing traitors to a capitalistic American order unlike the Bateses which actively participate in the subjugation of America and Americans to foreign powers. At the same time, the fringe conservatism of those like Glenn Beck emerge from this revamped product of the Reagan era by reshaping Tom Eckert and his relationship with the Mayors Bates and Jenkins. Whereas the 80s Mayor Bates presents an overt suspicion of politicians and bureaucrats, the 2012 Mayor Jenkins presents a weaker ineffectual leader who is all too ready to submit to communist authority.

Unlike the Red Dawn of 1984, 2012 gave us another model of fully-formed American masculinity in its Jed Eckert. Not a story of his maturation and development, the newer Red Dawn gives us a grown military hero who is represented as the film’s paragon of masculinity and he plays, to a much greater extent, the father’s role within the film. Matt becomes much more directly a product of Jed’s instruction than his father’s. From the opening scene through Jed’s reaction to Tom’s encouragement to Jed’s training the Wolverines to go to war, the camera fetishizes the brooding, stoic, and hulking Hemsworth. At the same time, Jed must die as one of the film’s sacrifices to the American patriotism it tries to construct.

At the same time, Tom’s long-concealed gun saves Jed during the Wolverine led assault on the North Korean headquarters. As Jed shoots a befuddled Cho in the head he proclaims, “You fucked with the wrong family.” Whereas the 1984 Red Dawn also underscores the importance of family and, through the Bates family, the dangers inherent in families with bad fathers, the 2012 version seems to want to retain that senses that certain types of American family will protect and defend the country even as other types threaten its security and stability. It is here that conservative masculinity, conservative notions of fatherhood, and fringe conservative paranoia about “progressives” and the Obama administration converge and are given voice. Like Glenn Beck who sees a communist threat in participation trophies and in the “useful idiots” that enabled the election of Barack Obama, the remake of Red Dawn offers a similar view of American liberalism and the supposedly “weak” masculinity it entails. Yet the film double codes its understanding of conservative masculinity by setting up Tom and Jed Eckert as dual and somewhat competing types of father figure. The one, infected by the less “tough” parenting style, Tom, can produce a Jed, but it is the Jeds that we need to save an American way of life. Whereas Glenn Beck sees a dangerous Progressive/ “Marxist” threat embodied in participation trophies, I see a dangerous conservative threat embodied in Red Dawn (2012). I suppose it is time to take that DVD out to the garage.

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Posted in Film, Tangents Tagged cultural studies, masculinity, gender, fatherhood, politics, Communism, Hollywood, Marxism, film, Obama, race, Red Dawn (2012), whiteness, Red Dawn (1984), Cold War, Glenn Beck, Reagan, Conservatism, Rambo, remakes, paranoid conservative fringe

“Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees”: Othello’s Tears and the Weeping Trees of Acacia and Myrrh. A Corrective Gloss to Most Modern Editions of Shakespeare.

I. “The Arbaian trees their medicinable gum”: Othello’s Weeping Trees

During Othello’s suicide speech, he makes several references that have attracted the attention of modern editors and scholars. The most famous concerns the textual variations between the Quarto and Folio versions of the line “Like a base Indian, threw a pearl away.” Whereas the Quarto reads “Indian,” the Folio reads “Judean.” While modern editors typically choose one or the other, they characteristically explain these variations in the footnotes. Both variations bear with them interesting interpretive frameworks and lenses, and, yet, both add to what some critics have noted as the tendency towards the “exotic” in Othello’s speech. In this post, however, I would like to address a footnote in nearly all modern editions that has attracted little critical attention. While not a textual variation, the consistent gloss on Othello’s “Arabian trees” which drop their “medicinable gum” as myrrh might be somewhat misleading.

Just after referring to either “the base Indian” or “the base Judean,” Othello directs his auditors’ attention towards his eyes, asking the assembled company to speak of him as he is and

…of one whose subdued eyes,
Albeit unused to the melting mood,
Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees
Their medicinable gum. (V.ii. 357-360).

Having just murdered Desdemona, the militaristic Othello, who has “done the state some service” (V.ii. 348), points to his predilection against weeping to prove the truth of the passion behind his current tears. His posturing before the gaze of the witnesses to his cruel actions attempts to shape the interpretive framework through which they see and remember him and his life. The unusual simile Othello adopts in this passage should give us pause and should, I would think, peak out interest to which “Arabian trees” Othello refers. Modern scholarly editions almost invariably gloss the reference as “myrrh.” I would like to propose an alternate possibility—that the reference can also be glossed as acacia, valued for its production of the Gum Arabic or gummi arabicum.

Mana from the Hortus Sanitatis. Yet another weeping tree.

Mana from the Hortus Sanitatis. Yet another weeping tree.

Both weeping trees, acacia and myrrh, align themselves with the play’s motif of vision and visuality. This focus on the visual has been the subject of much scholarly debate and criticism, but few, to my knowledge, addresses the subtle way in which Othello’s reference to those weeping trees plays into that motif. While early modern herbals and treatises on the eye note both myrrh and acacia’s value in medicines for the eyes, the gummi arabicum is much more readily found in pre- and early modern regimens for diseases and pains of the eye. This fact, of course, does not prove that Shakespeare intended the references to be taken as acacia and its Gum Arabic rather than to myrrh, but I do think that the critical predisposition to gloss the “Arabian trees” and its “medicinable gum” as myrrh obscures the way in which Othello’s simile reveals an important aspect of the way the visual plays an important role in the concluding scene of Shakespeare’s Othello. The “Arabian trees” and their “medicinable gum” Othello mentions in act five, scene two can be glossed as either myrrh or acacia, but, in their cultural associations with eye medicines, the simile becomes a metaphor for how Othello’s eyes and Phantasy, poisoned by Iago during the course of the play, become purified and cured, purging him of the private fantasies and phantasms that Iago shaped through the oral and the aural.

Before I turn to the “Arabian trees” directly, I first want to locate the reference within the immediate context of Othello’s suicide speech. Othello ends his life defending and trying to control the image of himself or, if you will, his species or phantasm in others’ Phantasies, by shaping how they will report his behavior and witnessed events.[i] He begins:

Soft you, a word or two before you go.
I have done the state some service, and they know’t.
No more of that. I pray you, in your letter,
When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am. Nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice. (V.ii. 347-352).

Just as Iago uses narrative to shape and manipulate Othello’s perception of Desdemona and of objects related to her like the handkerchief, Othello attempts to shape perception through narrative. He begins by conjuring Venice’s previous image of him within their Phantasies, making present for them his prior service to the state and the “parts,” “title,” and “perfect soul” that, he claimed, had “manifest[ed him] rightly” (I.ii. 31-32) during the inquest about his marriage. Othello stirs such images up in the witnesses’ minds only to dismiss them as no longer reflecting his social person and public image.

It is at this point that Othello makes the two references with which I opened this post. Even if Othello strives to control the codified narrative, he moves from desiring something that he hopes accurately depicts the events and circumstances to a slippery series of fictions and metaphors. He claims that, if the witnesses present things as they are,

Then must [they] speak
Of one that loved not wisely but too well,
Of one not easily jealous but, being wrought,
Perplexed in the extreme; of one whose hand,
Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe; of one whose subdued eyes,
Albeit unused to the melting mood,
Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees
Their medicinable gum. Set you down this… (V.ii. 347-360).

That Othello wants this narrative to be “set down” makes sense considering the ways oral narratives morph, combine and re-combine in the private Phantasy to shape the perceptions of people and objects. Explicitly calling attention to his current appearance at the point of weeping, Othello also explains his actions as jealousy to externalize his potential inward hiddenness.

Having lost the “reputation” and social standing he previously so rigorously defended and guarded, it can no longer overpower the shaping of his image resulting from his murderous actions. Since his prior standing no longer commands the narrative of his current state, Othello shifts towards narrative shaping of others’ perceptions. Having been schooled by Iago in the ways orality shapes the perception of people and objects, Othello uses the shifting ground of spoken language to shape the eventual codified narrative of his person and actions. As we have already seen by this point, perception never innocently represents reality and the witnesses’ “malice” might encourage fault-magnifying phantasies. Preferring the seeming purity and stability of written language, Othello hopes to use ephemeral orality to shape the codified account.[ii] Wanting them to report the “truth” of his situation and character, he hopes to avoid additions or extenuated perceptions, but he also imagines that his current words and actions will become codified in a “letter.” This “letter,” he hopes, will not be tainted by the phantasies of his auditors which might taint the relation with malice, allowing others to see him as he supposedly is.

While stressing the importance of an uncorrupted narrative, Othello moves towards metaphor and fiction-making to shape other’s perceptions of his character and actions. In one simile he deploys, Othello cryptically describes his weeping eye peculiarly and pointedly as “Arabian trees” that drop “medicinable gum.” The Norton Shakespeare, following nearly all of the modern editions I know of, glosses this as a reference to myrrh, and no other editions, to my knowledge, seriously consider a second possibility. While the “Arabian trees” which drop “medicinable gum” might be myrrh, there is evidence that Othello refers, not to myrrh, but to what early modern herbals call the acacia or Aegyptian Thorne.

In an early gloss of Othello’s line that mentions Gum Arabic, Sir John Charles Bucknill’s 1860 The Medical Knowledge of Shakespeare, dismisses the possibility, saying, “Othello compares the tears, which flow in his dread remorse, to the gum of Arabia ; probably not gum Arabic, but myrrh is meant” (Bucknill 274). Bucknill does not explain why he discounts the possibility that “medicinable gum” might refer to acacia and its gummi arabicum, but late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century editions of Shakespeare often cite him as an authority and leave it at that.[iii] Most twentieth-century editions that I know of do not even propose that one read “Arabian trees” and their “medicinable gum” as acacia and its gummi arabicum.

In my recent research while revising this post, I did discover one Shakespearean scholar who does take them as references to acacia and Gum Arabic. Geraldo De Sousa’s At Home in Shakespeare’s Tragedies, makes mention of the Gum Arabic, and offers that Othello’s reference relates to English commerce and trade with Africa and the Middle-East as well as to how late sixteenth to early seventeenth-century English representations of Africa and the Middle-East often collapsed their separation and obscured the boundary between them. De Sousa raises several interesting interpretive possibilities as they pertain to Othello’s possible reference to the Arabic Gum.[iv] As its trade relates to international trade and to England’s relationship with Africa and the Middle-East, his discussion of gummi arabcum does seem to take the possibility that Othello refers to acacia and its gum seriously and without question. To my knowledge, De Sousa is unique in his critical approach to the references, standing alone in his assurance that Shakespeare refers to the Arabic Gum, but he does not develop how taking Othello’s “Arabian trees” as acacia plays into the motifs of vision and visuality.

Both myrrh and acacia serve as exotic references of the order that typically populate Othello’s speeches, but they are additionally significant in that each tree produced products used in eye medicines. While both are associated with eye-medicines, the gummi arabicum has stronger associations with the eyes in sixteenth-century herbals and optical treatises. First, I want to look at several early modern herbals’ descriptions of acacia before I set those against descriptions of myrrh. The main value of the acacia or “Aegyptian Thorne” was a product harvested from it called Arabic Gum or Gummi Arabicum. Thomas Halle, in an appended “Table” that is mostly a translation of the work of thirteenth-century surgeon, Lafranco of Milan, describes the gum collected from the Aegyptian Thorne as “Gummi Arabicum founde (and also so called) of the Arabians, because it is there moste plentifull, and also Bibilonicum & Sarasenicum, vpon lyke reason, is ye teares of the thorny tree called Acacia & Spina Aegyptia” and may be “called Gummi Acaciae, or Gummi Spinae Aegyptiae” (Lanfranco 47-48).

It is significant that Lafranco describes the gum of the acacia itself as “teares.” Inverting the metaphor of “Arabian Trees” found in the later Othello where Othello likens himself to a tree, Lafranco personifies the trees as having tears. The relationship between acacia and the eyes do not, however, end with the metaphor. Both Othello and Halle’s Lafranco associate their “medicinable gums” with the eyes, and the gummi arabicum’s relationship to vision becomes even clearer when one turns to its supposed “vertues” and uses. Lanfranco goes on to state that Gummi Arabicum is an excellent cure for the eyes, for “it is (as the tree wherof it commeth) of cooling and drying facultie, without sharpenes or byting: And therfore a commodious lenitiue medicine, for the grefes and peines of the eyes” (Lafranco and Hall 47-48). I will return to its use against the “grefes and peines of the eyes” a little later, but first want to turn to how other late sixteenth-century herbals describe acacia and Gum Arabic.

 

John Gerard's Acacia or Aegyptian Thorne.

John Gerard’s Acacia or Aegyptian Thorne.

 

Several other contemporaries like Jacques Guillemeau, and William Bullein mention Gummi Arabicum as an ingredient in cures for the eyes. In his Bulwarke of Defence, Bullein declares,

Acacia commeth from a thorne in Aegipt, whych hath coddes growing vpon it lyke a Broome, out of which coddes, leaues, and seede, is pressed forth the gumme Acatia, which wyl restraine and stoppe most effectually, and is cold and dry. This Acatia aboue all gummes hath vertue to coole and stop bloud, and bloudy flixes, and coole the burnyng of the eyes. (Bullein 61).

Following Dioscorides, John Gerard describes the Aegyptian Thorne in a similar fashion:

Dioscorides maketh mention of Acacia, whereof the first is the true and right Acacia, which is a shrub or hedge tree, but not growing right or straight vp as other small small trees do: his branches are wooddie, beset with many hard and long Thorns; about which grow the leaues, compact of many small leaues clustering about one side, as in the Lentill: the floures are whitish, the husks or cods be plaine and flat, yea very broad like vnto Lupines, especially on that side where the seed growes, which is contained sometimes in one part, and sometimes in two parts of the husk, growing together in a narrow necke: the seed is smooth and glistering. There is a blacke iuice taken out of these huskes, if they be dried in the shadow when they be ripe; but if when they are not ripe, then it is somewhat red: some do wring out a iuice out of the leaues and fruit: there floweth also a gum out of this tree which is the gum of Arabia, called Gum Arabicke. (Gerard 1149).

While the plant is more of a “shrub” than Othello’s “tree,” most of the herbals mention it as getting as large as a tree, or, like Gerard, consider it a “hedge tree.” Both descriptions above mention the way in which the juice of the acacia is acquired through pressing the cods, leaves, and husks. Whereas Bullein suggests that “gumme Acatia” comes from this process, Gerard and Lafranco note that the gum of Arabia or “Gum Arabicke” drops or flows from the tree itself. The most common method of harvesting Gum Arabic, however, is by wounding one of the tree’s branches, which causes the sap to seep from the tree, hardening into nuggets as the sap dries.[v]

While I have yet to find an herbal that describes the collection of Gum Arabic in a similar fashion, Robert Greene’s Mourning Garment offers an interesting if limited reference in the section where Rabbi Bilessies offers advice to his son, Philador, on the importance of secrecy. He advises, “Be … in secrecy like the Arabick tree, that yeelds no gumme but in the darke night” (Greene Cii verso). This unusual simile in a passage that might have either served as a source for or been inspired by Polonius’ advice to Laertes in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Bilesses reports that the gum collected from acacia would appear only at night and uses this notion to construct a simile of how to act with secrecy. For Bilessies, one should only show themselves at night, only revealing their products when under the cover of darkness. Though I cannot find another source that describes the production of gummi arabicum in quite the same way and while we can never be sure that Shakespeare was familiar with Greene’s Mourning Garment at the time he penned Othello, the notion of secrecy and darkness appearing in this passage resembles the metaphorical valences of light and black in Shakespeare’s later play.

Before I return to the acacia as it relates to Othello, I will now turn to descriptions of myrrh as found in several herbals. The Grete Herball describes,

Myrre is hote and drye in the second degre. It is the gomme of a tre that groweth in Inde whiche in somer tyme cleveth to the tree. Myrre that is yellowe or somwat browne is best. There be two maners of it. One is meane, and the other course. Some call it Troelyten for the place that it groweth in. It hathe vertue to conforte, and joyne lymmes togyder. To waste and sprede humours by the complexion and qualyte thereof It keepeth fro cottynge, and thereof in olde tyme folke anoynted deed bodyes therewyth to kepe them longe. It may be kept a C. yeres. (Anon. [Q.iv.] recto).

Noting that myrrh is used in regimens “for the pose,” “for the brest,” and “for the gommes,” The Great Herball does not mention its relationship to treatments of the eyes even when other contemporary sources do in a way not all that dissimilar from the ways in which the Aegyptian Thorne is described.

 

Myrrh from the Hortus Sanitatis.

Myrrh from the Hortus Sanitatis.

 

As Halle’s Lafranco puts it,

Myrrha … heateth and dryeth in the seconde degree: and therefore glueth freshe woundes, especially of the head : Having also much bitternes, whereby it killeth wormes. It hath moreover a moderate abstertion: by reason whereof, it is mixed with medicines made for the eyes, for the olde cough, & for peinfull breathing. It hath also power to comfort and to defend from putrefaction, and to expell superfluities. It mundifieth rotten ulcers, and provoketh sleape. Howe be it the use of Myrrhe is not altogether hurtles, bothe for that the onely smell thereof acuseth head ache: and also because in the best myrrhe is found Opocarpasum, a thyng sayeth Galen, verye hurtfull and deadly, and hath kylled many unwittynglye takyng it with myrrhe. Myrrha is the teares or droppyng of a tree growynge in Arabia, not unlike to Spinae Aegiptiae, whereof ther are dyvers kyndes. (Lafranco 75-76).

Here, Lafranco describes myrrh as “teares” from an Arabian tree, and likens the droppings to those of the Aegyptian Thorne or acacia. What strikes me, however, is that Lafranco uses the acacia or Aegyptian Thorne as the frame of reference for myrrh rather than vice-versa. In this passage, the acacia becomes the normative tree to which myrrh is likened. In other herbals, one also finds acacia is as important if not more so that myrrh. Gerard, for example, while including a section on the Aegyptian Thorne in his 1597 herbal, does not bother to have an entry on myrrh at all. This is not to say that myrrh was culturally insignificant, but these authors do devote more attention to acacia and set acacia as the normative reference point for weeping trees that drop “medicinable” gum. While both references would be current in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries, one cannot discount the possibility that the “Arabian trees” refer to either classification of Arabian weeping trees.

Similar, too, is the way in which both myrrh and gummi arabicum are harvested from their respective trees. Here, I think, is where Othello’s reference becomes interesting within the context of his suicide speech. Both gums are harvested when their respective trees are wounded, cut into or otherwise gouged. By wounding the bark, the sap is released and can be collected. While none of the herbals I have looked at describe this process in precisely these terms, their descriptions too reveal a violence involved in harvesting Gum Arabic. As John Gerard puts it in the passage on acacia I cited earlier, one must “wring the juice” from the leaves and fruit, and William Bullein offers that the juice is “pressed” from the tree.

The harvesting method relates to Othello as his own tears result from an act of wounding. Having first been injured by the state for questioning his marriage to Desdemona, then through Iago’s internal wounds that corrupt his Phantasy and his image of her, and again through his act of killing her, Othello receives a wounding both internally in his humoral reconstitution and in his mind, and externally in the effects upon his public persona and reputation. These “woundings” cause Othello, whose eyes are unused to the melting mood, to weep.

While sixteenth-century herbals associate both myrrh and acacia Africa and the middle-east, both myrrh and gummi arabicum are harvested from their thorny trees by injuring the bark of their respective plants, the gummi arabicum has the strongest associations with cures for the eyes. The German George Bartisch’s 1583 masterpiece on diseases of the eye, his [Opthalmodouleia] Das ist Augendienst, lists both myrrh and gummi arabicum as ingredients in his cures for the eyes, but much more commonly makes references to gummi arabicum. But, as I’ve said, both are associated with Arabia, both are described as coming from the “tears” of a tree, and both are used in eye medicines.

The Gum Arabic was not only used for eye medicines and cures. As Gerard would go on to say, “The iuice of Acacia stoppeth the laske, the inordinate course of womens termes, and mans inuoluntarie issue called Gonorrhaea, if it be drunke in red wine. It healeth the blastings and inflammations of the eies,” and that “The gum doth binde and somewhat coole: it hath also ioined vnto it an emplaistick quality, by which it dulleth or alayeth the sharpnesse of the medicines wherewith it is mixed. Being applied with the white and yolk of an egge, it suffereth not blisters to rise in burned or scalded parts” (Gerard 1331). Many other contemporary herbals associated not only the juice, but also the gum with cures of the eyes, but I will return below to these other uses as they might relate to Shakespeare’s play.

In a sense, Othello is “curing” his eyes through his tears, and it has been Iago’s affect on them that has “subdued” them. Othello not only wants his listeners to “set…down” the fact that he cries, but he simultaneously points out that those very “subdued eyes” drip their own medicine, and indicate the restoration of his ability to “see” correctly. The tears become the antidote to Iago’s poison, and his “eyes” have been cured of the malicious shaping of envy and jealousy. The watery eye is likened to an “Arabian tree” (whether acacia or myrrh) that also helps “restore” or “cure” sight. To take this even further, Gerard notes that the gum “dulleth or alayeth the sharpnesse of the medicines wherewith it is mixed,” and Othello’s tears “dull or alayeth the shaprnesse of [Iago’s] medicines.”

The Phantasy which had been prodded into service of Iago’s envious revenge on Othello’s ability to see has not vanished entirely, however, because Othello turns from “speak[ing] of [himself] as [he is]” to once more tapping into the fantastic as he continues,

And say besides that in Aleppo once,
Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state,
I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog
And smote him thus. (V.ii. 361-365).

Othello deploys the Phantasy to enact the radical self-splitting of his “bloody period.” This fantastical tale, a product of Phantasy, captures the sense of self-splitting that misrecognition has encouraged within him, and which makes Brabanzio’s earlier question about Othello’s ability to “see” prophetic.

II. “If thou hast eyes to see”: Othello’s Jealous[e]ies

While Iago will ultimately push Othello over the edge, it is Brabanzio that first questions his Othello’s ability to “see.” The problem of “seeing” surfaces that conceal hidden desires, motivations and actions emerges in the trial scene just after Brabanzio discovers his own inability to penetrate the hidden secrets of his daughter’s appearance and is refused “justice” by the court, when Brabanzio offers Othello a warning, “Look to her Moor, if thou hast eyes to see,/ She has deceived her father and may thee” (I.iii. 291-292). Brabanzio’s conditional “if” seems startlingly out of context in this line, and Brabanzio questions Othello’s ability to “see” beyond the potentially deceptive visual to the truth.

One wonders how one could have eyes but to see, but here Brabanzio launches a subtle attack on Othello’s humanity by suggesting that he has eyes that insufficiently discern truth beyond the realm of the immediately visible. Brabanzio broaches the issue for Othello and of the play as a whole that what is seen may in fact not be what is real, and this suggestion leaves Othello in a quandary. The lesson Brabazio teaches here, is one that he has just recently learned from his daughter. Since Brabanzio can no longer trust the external appearance and behavior, coding it with an ulterior and hidden motive, he claims that were he to have a daughter besides Desdemona he should become a “tyrant”. While the “lesson” may be part of the reason Brabanzio makes this statement to Othello, it does not explain his framing it in the conditional. The conditional “if” questions Othello’s eyes, and it does not make much sense to wonder if he has “eyes to see” unless Brabanzio questions Othello’s ability to perceive and judge the hidden truths behind the world of appearances.

Similar questions about Othello’s ability to “see” rightly emerge when Iago confesses to Roderigo that Othello chose Cassio as his lieutenant in spite of what Othello’s eyes had seen in battle, choosing a lieutenant who practices the stratagems and deceptions of war rather than one proved in actual battle. A special reciprocity in the form of Iago’s later attack and the perceived injustice he voices in this earlier exchange with Roderigo. Iago claims that Othello chose Cassio for his “bookish theoric” and did so against [Othello’s] “eyes which had seen the proof” (I. i. 25) of Iago’s military prowess. According to Iago here, Othello fails to discern the truth of value through what he has seen, and Iago sets out to punish Othello’s eyes for that inability. His attack focuses on the very aspects of Othello’s character by which he feels slighted; Othello’s power to advance Cassio before him, and Othello’s eyes for that have been responsible for failing to “see” a perceived truth and misjudging Iago’s worth in respect to his rival. Iago finds “judgment” lacking in Othello’s eyes, and his method of attack will prove to turn Othello’s Judgment or Reason against his eyes.

The play returns to the idea of not being able to discern truth from falsehood and a failure of the eyes in Othello’s later interaction with Brabanzio. During the trial scene, Othello emerges on the stage as a seemingly flawless figure, appearing “all in all sufficient,” until Iago begins to undermine that self-image and his image and reputation for others by corrupting his Judgment. Brabanzio’s statement about Othello’s inability to see haunts him through the remainder of the play and those anxieties are prodded by an Iago who thinks, too, that Othello’s eyes lack judgment. Iago reminds Othello of Desdemona’s ability to deceive, insinuating hidden faults as sin lie behind her proper appearance, when prompting him to recall that “She that so young could give out such a seeming,/ To seel her father’s eyes up close as oak,/ He thought ‘twas witchcraft!” (III. iii. 213-215).

Brabanzio’s “seel[ed]” eyes echo Othello’s own concerns that his marriage to Desdemona will negatively affect his military office. Othello famously proclaims that he does not desire Desdemona’s wishes to be fulfilled because he wants to “please the palate of [his] appetite” (I.iii. 261), but rather to be “free and bounteous to [Desdemona’s] mind;” the very mind that was able to picture his own. The origin of their love marks an appropriate and positive function of the ability to construct mental images of another person, where the internal images correspond to the external appearances of truth. In addition to assuring the Senators not only that he desires Desdemona’s company to be “free and bounteous” to Desdemona’s mind, Othello assures that her traveling with him will not be “scant” in their “serious and great business,” saying,

…No, when light-winged toys
Of feathered Cupid seel with wanton dullness
My speculative and officed instruments,
That my disports corrupt and taint my business,
Let housewives make a skillet of my helm,
And all indign and base adversities
Make head against my estimation. (I.iii. 267-273).

The implication is that Othello cannot “see” the gap between the external and internal, between appearance and reality, between externally verifiable and internally concealed. The irony is that light-winged toys and “trifles light as air” do “seel” Othello’s speculative instruments later, although not as a result of “featherd Cupid,” but instead because of the interpretive framework Iago instructs and insinuates within Othello’s mind and Phantasy.

Othello assures the Duke and Senators that his “disports” will not “corrupt and taint [his] business,” but the ultimate irony will be that Iago will be able to “seel” his “speculative and officed instruments,” and that Iago’s envy rather than Othello’s disports will “corrupt and taint [his] business.” It is later that Iago reminds Othello that Desdemona had been able to “seel her father’s eyes up as close as an oak,” but the “seeling” of Othello’s eyes will come from a very different type of “corruption” than the “wanton dullness” he dismisses here. Not only does Iago’s narrative “seel” Othello’s “eye,” but his “indign and base adversities” make head against his “estimation.” The “estimation” to which Othello refers means not only others’ “estimation” of his qualities, but also his to his Reason. The “Estimation” and the “Cogitation” were dual processes that had been consolidated under the powers of reason in the middle ventricle of the brain, but closer to the composition and performance of Othello, the two were often subsumed under the broadened powers of Reason or Judgment. It is not his “disports” and dalliances with Desdemona that “corrupt and taint” him, but instead Iago’s ability to “puddle [Othello’s] spirit,” including his “vissive spirits” upon which the Reason and soul depended to make proper judgments.

When Iago’s “poison” begins to work, we will come to see that all kinds of “adversities” begin to attack his Reason. This is not to say that Othello is not simultaneously referring to “indign and base adversities” he associates with “housewives” that will turn his helmet into a “skillet,” rendering his implements of war into domestic ones. Additionally, however, the “housewives” here could also refer to the sensory apparatus itself, which Du Laurens and others considered the “handmaidens” to the Soul that could threaten to turn his helmet or the head within it into a skillet that would open him to all kinds of “vaine apprehensions and phantasies” when corrupted, shaped, or distorted.

Othello’s tears signify not only his return to the ability to properly “see” the consequences of his actions and the world around him, but also brings him back to the ability to properly shape his Phantasy to produce a counter-narrative and counter-perception of the ways in which Venetian society misrecognizes him in a way parallel to his own eventual misrecognition of Desdemona. The real tragedy here is that he had the ability to “properly judge” before those acts of misrecognition and Iago’s counter-narrative were able to convince him he had not. If Othello can be read as an exploration of the problems of a visual based epistemology, Othello’s reference to the medicinable gum enacts its cure; the eyes themselves metaphorically “drop” their own “cures.” This reference serves a dual function as Othello counteracts the denial of his of eye/ I/ [e]I[e] that emerged from Brabanzio’s conditional “if thou hast eyes to see,” as well as to reinforce the cleansing and healing of those eyes that Iago has prompted him not to trust through tears.[v]

The radical self-dividing within Othello’s fictional framing of his own suicide, as is often noted, pits three Othellos against one another. The “turbaned Turk,” being the racist image of the “uncivilized” aspect of Othello’s identity which commits violence against Desdemona, “beat” a Venetian, the “civilized” aspect of his identity that commanded reputation and authority, but Othello claims a stable “I” in the moment of self-slaughter. Turning from the fictional setting of “Aleppo,” Othello brings both the narrative and himself into the present to assert a new “I” that finally defeats the “Turk.” The three Othellos constitute not only an internalized self-splitting, but also speak to the fractured public perception of his roles and place within Venetian society.

The movements out of fictional narrative and towards action, and from radical self-splitting to stability, come only at the moment of his death, and only after the truth comes to light and his tears drop a type of “medicine.” Othello’s “cure” to his jealousy and madness arrives too late, but, I would argue, the change comes both through his murderous actions and through his act of weeping. While herbals associate both with eye medicines, they typically associate Aegyptian Thorne more thoroughly with the eyes. As I have suggested, Othello’s tears do operate as a type of medicine for his jealous condition and for counteracting the pestilence with which Iago has infected Othello.

While I cannot say that the reference to the “Arabian trees” and their “medicinable gum” points definitively to either the acacia or myrrh, I do think that both of their properties and their relationship to eye-medicines have some bearing on the play’s dominant visual metaphors. And while both “medicinable gums” come from “Arabian trees,” the fact that the gummi arabicum actually refers to its supposed place of origin speaks in its favor. Both “Arabian trees” have similar descriptions and some overlapping properties but differ in some of their “vertues” and uses in ways that might be important for Othello, and might lead to potentially rich readings if glosses did not prune the possibilities.

Other “vertues” differ substantially for the acacia in ways that might have some bearing on readings of Othello. Bullein notes that acacia “stoppeth the blouddy flixe,” and Gerard details that “the iuice of Acacia stoppeth the laske, the inordinate course of womens termes, and mans inuoluntarie issue called Gonorrhaea, if it be drunke in red wine.” While critics rarely speculate anymore about Othello and Desdemona’s interrupted wedding night, Stanley Cavell offered a reading of the play that suggested the interrupted wedding night, the wedding sheets, and the handkerchief all might represent the possibility that Desdemona either did not bleed during their consummation, or that their marriage was unconsummated.[vii] With such psychoanalytic readings, however, Othello’s final reference might have some relationship to either Desdemona’s lack of blood upon consummation or to her possible menstruation. Additionally, it might relate to the possibility of Othello’s sexual dysfunction and impotence in that gummi arabicum might also have a relationship to sexually transmitted diseases.

Even without speculating about this interrupted wedding night, the possible allusion to sexually transmitted disease and to menstruation relates to feminist critiques of Othello’s anxieties over human, especially female, sexuality. As critics have long noted, Othello has an unusual aversion towards and outright repulsion from sexuality in general and female sexuality in particular. The metaphors of vision, poison and disease, and an anxiety over female sexuality and sexual organs might converge and purge one another in the simile Othello deploys to describe his tears. Unfortunately for Desdemona, this cure comes too late to save her, but it also only comes at the moment just before the eponymous hero kills himself. Realizing that his skepticism and anxieties over female sexuality and bodily corruption caused him to kill his innocent wife, Othello finds a momentary cure for his ailments just before his own death.

If the reference to “Arabian trees” is taken as a reference to acacia rather than to myrrh, its associations with both sexually transmitted diseases and with menstruation should give us pause. The reference then represents his tears as metaphorical cures for disease and as a medicine to curtain “the inordinate course of womens termes,” but both of these concerns with regards to Desdemona’s body or his own reveal either a continuing anxiety about human sexuality or as a cure for those very anxieties that made him susceptible to Iago’s machinations. On the one hand, Othello implies that both disease and menstruation need to be “cured,” and that his tears signify a type of cure for each. On the other hand, Othello implies that his weeping cleanses his mind of both concerns, as if the tears themselves purge his brain of those very anxieties.

Although the metaphors of sight in Othello have been worked and reworked in countless book chapters and articles, the reference to the “Arabian trees” towards the conclusion of the play informs the motif of the visual that runs through it. While I will address the effects of the visual on the Phantasy and the significance of opening the interpretive possibilities by acknowledging that the line may refer to the acacia or Aegyptian Thorne in later posts, I do think I have offered enough evidence to prove that Othello’s “Arabian trees” should not be too readily glossed as “myrrh.”

III. “My life upon her faith”: Cleansing Othello’s Eyes and Phantasy

If I am correct that the reference (even if read as myrrh) metaphorically associates his tears with medicines for the eyes, it illuminates an aspect of this motif that previously remained in the shadows. Othello’s tears represent a cure of sorts. A cure for the jealousy Iago inspired. A cure for the wrath this jealousy caused. A cure for Othello’s delusional beliefs about Desdemona’s fidelity. And all of this constitutes a cure for his manner of seeing. The jealousy Iago so carefully fostered and generated produces in Othello a manner of jealous “seeing as” that keeps Othello from seeing Desdemona properly and correctly. In a sense, Iago shapes Othello’s phantasm or species of Desdemona from one that inspires attraction to one that provokes revulsion, jealousy, and rage.

In another post, I will discuss the important role of the Phantasy in this process in relation to Othello in particular, but in my earlier post on Petrarch’s Secretum, I discussed the Phantasy’s privileged position in determinations of good and evil, attraction and revulsion. There, I argued that Petrarch aligns the Phantasy with the body and links its evaluations with the corporeal world and its objects which detract from and distract the soul. Similarly, Iago manipulates Othello’s image of Desdemona by infecting his Phantasy and corrupting the phantasms of her that it contains. Iago shapes the phantasm from one that inspires attraction and reverence to one that produces repulsion and attraction. As such, Iago perverts the functioning of Othello’s eyes, causing him to see her differently.

The tears function as a cleansing act, purging Othello of the false phantasms to which he has become susceptible. Through Othello’s reference to the “Arabian trees” and their “medicinable gum,” Othello underscores the eye-infection Iago has caused through his shaping language, suggesting that he is cured of this corruption. As I noted above, however, if read as simultaneously registering a continued anxiety over the status of Desdemona’s body and of female sexuality, his disease persists, but, even still, Othello’s phantasm of his wife is stripped of the puddling Iago created.

This metaphorical and perhaps literal cleansing restores the phantasm of Desdemona as the faithful and chaste wife, stripping her of the pollution caused by Othello’s belief that she has been unfaithful, reclaiming that phantasm from being a source of revulsion to one of attraction and from being a source of hate to one of love. Iago’s ability to manipulate Othello’s private Phantasy and his phantasm of Desdemona constitutes a secular version of the power over the phantasms that Kramer and Sprenger attribute to the devil and to demons in their Malleus Maleficarum. In their Malleus, the Phantasy and its species or phantasms, as with Petrarch’s Secretum, were positioned as central to the personal emotional responses to perception.

As Kramer and Sprenger state in their Malleus regarding the supposed transformations of humans into the forms of non-human animals,

…Devils can by witchcraft cause a man to be unable to see his wife rightly, and the converse. And this comes from an affectation of the fancy, so that she is represented to him as an odious and horrible thing. (Kramer and Sprenger 63).

While referring immediately to questions about the possibility of demonically inspired transformations of human into non-human animals, the passage can be read in relation to Othello in a very different context. While Kramer and Sprenger reveal that such issues were couched in controversy, they state that the devil and demons do have some power over the internal and external senses. The devil and his minions, they offer, cannot force feelings of love and hate directly, they can, however, delude by manipulating the sensitive soul and the sensory apparatus.

In Othello, we find a very different scenario that the immediate context of the previous passage in the Malleus Maleficarum, but the different contexts allow us to see a similar cognitive structure at work in the parallels. Instead of the devil or his demons, we find the secularized figure of Iago. While not transformed into the form of a non-human animal in Othello’s sensory apparatus, Desdemona’s image is rendered just as “odious and horrible” as any borrowed form. While not rendered “invisible,” Iago’s manipulations and Othello’s jealousy have made it impossible for him to see her correctly just the same. Instead of making Othello physically incapable of seeing his wife or metamorphosing her external form in Othello’s exterior or interior sense, Iago shapes the reception of that form, phantasm, or species in Othello’s inner sense. Instead of directly turning Othello’s love into hate, Iago manipulates Othello’s sense of Desdemona, turning her from an object of love into one of hate by way of the Phantasy and the private phantasms.

Instead of gum that appears only under the cover of darkness as in Robert Greene’s description of “Arabick trees” in his Mourning Garment, Othello’s gum-tears appear publically and for all to see. While they might suggest a purging or cleansing of Othello’s visual powers and his judgment, they, like the narrative in which he embeds them, might only be shed and discussed to shape other’s perceptions of Othello’s characters and actions. In the world of the play, however, this remains a secret that will never come fully to light. It was secrecy and the threat of potential secrecy that partially led to Othello’s “blindness” in the first place. As Iago discusses his plot to poison Othello’s mind by making him suspect his wife and in his assault upon the Moorish eyes he feels have wronged him, “Hell and night/ Must bring this monstrous birth to the world’s light” (I.iii.385-386).

It is the poisoning or pollution of the senses that are (at least partially) washed away with Othello’s tears. Those tears are produced by and produce an anagnorisis where the recognition comes not through some external object, symbol, birthmark, or other external form, but through a shift in a way of seeing—specifically a way of seeing his now dead wife. The metaphor of the “Arabian trees” and their “medicinable gum”—regardless of whether the reference is to acacia or to myrrh—highlights the “curing” of Othello’s eyes as well as his manner of “seeing as.” The main dfference here is that this late recognition serves as a corrective to the earlier misrecognition inspired and cultivated by Iago. Othello’s private Phantasy, which had rendered Desdemona as something “odious and horrible,” now cleansed of his jealous[e]ies and Iago’s manipulating influence, once again “sees” Desdemona and the truth of his odious fantasies and his horrible actions. Inverting the paradigm of Oedipus, his recognition leads not to blindness but to sight, but, as with Oedipus, this recognition comes too late.

The whole is further complicated by the fact that Othello self-consciously constructs the “tale” of his own personal history and subsequent suicide. His tears and his metaphor of those tears shape the phantasm of himself and the narrative controlling his previous actions and culminating suicide. In this sense, Othello deploys the tricks of Iago to self-consciously control the narrative shaping of the phantasm of himself in the minds of his auditors. The pre-jealous Othello was no stranger to this trick of narrative as the stories of his travels and travails transformed the species or phantasm of himself within Desdemona’s inner sense from one that inspired repulsion to one that attracted and inspired love. As an inverse to Iago’s verbal manipulation, this process too parallels the one found in the Malleus Maleficarum where angels and devils are granted special access to and manipulation of the contents and objects of the Phantasy.

The intersection of the visual, the aural, and the oral brings up one more complicating layer to the early modern sensory apparatus which stressed the interrelation and conjunction of the external senses within the inner senses, and especially in the inner sense’s sensus communis and the attached and related Phantasy. While we are typically inclined to see the sensory data from each of the discrete external senses as separate and incommensurate, the theories of the sensitive soul, its Phantasy, and its objects as species and phantasms, stressed their interrelation and conjunction.[viii]

It is Othello’s tears that purge him of the tainted phantasms Iago narratively and interpretively sculpts and shapes within Othello’s mind and Phantsy. Those tears metaphorically and perhaps literally purify his image of Desdemona and represent a return to her right reception within his inner senses. Restoring the ability to “see” which has been questioned by Brabanzio and shaped by the “demi-devil” Iago, Othello turns his eyes inwards to see the “odious and horrible” form he has become, and sees the effects of his tainted judgment and manner of seeing. His reference to the “Arabian tree” and its “medicinable gum” highlight the notion Othello’s eyes and Phantasy are cured through tears.

While this aspect might be visible if taken for myrrh rather than for acacia and its gummi arabicum, that aspect comes into greater relief and focus when one considers how much the Gum Arabic was associated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with restoratives or cures for the eyes. But it is not the physical eye alone that his tears cure. Those tears also purge, clean, and cure the sensory apparatus that connects that external sense to the internal senses. It is Othello’s Phantasy as well as his “spirits” that Iago has “puddled,” causing him to misrecognize Desdemona by shaping how her species and phantasm are received by his Phantasy. This eventual misrecognition of Desdemona, in part, has its origins in the Venetian misrecognition of Othello as becomes apparent in Brabanzio’s question of whether Othello has eyes to see during the trial scene. Othello’s anxieties that he might not have eyes to see, the fear that he might be deficient in his judgment produces the very result he fears he is already plagued with. Iago gives birth to his monstrous plot not only against Othello by also Othello’s eyes and the judgment to which they are linked. This plot sets out to produce in Othello’s manner of seeing the very deficiency he (most likely wrongly) senses in Othello’s election of Cassio as lieutenant. Iago punishes Othello’s eyes. The secularized “demi-devil,” Iago, distorts and twists the reception of Desdemona’s phantasm in such a way as to turn her into something “odious and horrible,” but Othello restores his sight just before the moment of his death.

Works Cited

Anonymous. The Grete Herball. London: Peter Treveris, 1521.

Bartisch, George. [Opthalmodouleia] Das ist Augendienst. Dresden: durch Matthes Stockel, 1583.

Bucknill, Sir John Charles. The Medical Knowledge of Shakespeare. Longman, 1860.

Bullein, William. Bulwarke of Defence. London, 1579.

Cavell, Stanley. Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996.

Gerard, John. The Herball or Generall Historie of Plantes. London: John Norton, 1597.

Greene, Robert. Mourning Garment, Given Him by Repentance at the Funerals of Love (etc.). George Purhlowe, 1616.

Kramer, Heinrich and James Sprenger. The Malleus Maleficarum. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1971.

Lafranco, of Milan and John Hall. A most excellent and learned woorke of chirgerie. London: Thomas Marshe, 1565.

Park, David. The Fire Within the Eye. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1997.

Shakespeare, William, and Modern Language Association of America. A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Othello. [c1886. J.B. Lippincott & Company, 1886.

Shakespeare, William. The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition. Norton, 1997.

Sousa, Geraldo U. De. At Home in Shakespeare’s Tragedies. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013.

 


[i] If one wonders about my use of the terms Phantasy, species, and phantasms here, see my other posts on the subject.

[ii] Othello already proves his adroit use of narrative to shape perception, emotion, and belief even before he succumbs to Iago’s influence when he describes his courtship with Desdemona. There, his fantastic tales inspire Desdemona’s love for him. While his tales of travel and travail shape Desdemona’s perception of and feelings towards him, Othello has encountered and recognized how powerful narrative can be in the shaping of perception of others through his interaction with Iago.

[iii] See, for example, A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Othello, page 322.

[iv] See pages 67-70. As it is somewhat tangential to his arguments about representations of Africa and the Middle-East, Sousa does not debate the issue, but takes it for granted that Othello’s lines refer to the gum Arabic. This is all the more striking considering that very few even consider the possibility.

[v] I will return to the method of acquiring the Gummi Arabicum later in this post as it relates to Othello’s struggle with identity.

[vi] I have written on this elsewhere, and I will post my thoughts on this later.

[vii] See Cavell’s Disowning Knowledge pages 132-137.

[viii] I will not comment on this further in this post, but will return to some much more speculative thoughts on the relationship among the external senses in pre-and early modern senses of sense-making in later posts.

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Posted in Scholarship, Shaping Sense, William Shakespeare, Tangents Tagged Shakespeare, vision, Othello, early modern, jealousy, Herbals, Iago, history of the senses, seeing as, imagination, Gerard, Petrarch, Phantasy

My Medieval Grumpy Cat meme made it into a Dutch newspaper!

Since I’m in the process of tweaking the new site and format as well as finalizing revisions on two new posts, I thought I would take a break to share that one of my Medieval Grumpy Cat memes found its way into a Dutch newspaper.

Holy crap! I can't read the text (no matter, since I can't read Dutch anyway), but was happy to find that someone Tweeted this image.

Holy crap! I can’t read the text (no Dutch), but was happy to find that someone Tweeted this image.

I am also happy to report that Emir O. Filipović has been receiving much deserved recognition for his find. His original image and story has most notably been picked up by both National Geographic and Discovery. Also read Emir’s excellent post on finding the cat paw-print manuscript here. Happy he’s finally getting some acknowledgement for the manuscript pictures he has taken.

Okay, back to website tweaks, broken servers, Othello’s “medicinable gum,” and the early modern visual species.

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Posted in Satire, Silly Things Tagged manuscripts, medieval, Emir Filipovic, Erik Kwakkel, Grumpy Cat 1 Comment

#WoodcutWednesday-Haters Gonna Hate

I have been experimenting with ways to incorporate earlier #WoodcutWednesdays into my blog, but have not found a suitable format yet. I tried out a plugin that pulled Tweets from Twitter, but it does not yet have the functionality to pull the images along with it. I’ve also been trying to creat dynamic sliders, but haven’t yet found one that does what I want it to do with the captions. If only Flash weren’t dying or if I knew JavaScript, I might be able to get this up and running.

In the meantime, I will continue to experiment. Here is one of my attempts, even if I’m not completely happy with it yet. Let me know if you have any suggestions.

20130410-173533.jpg

Per comment request. I'm sure there is a better possible translation, and, if you can think of one, let me know.

Per comment request. I’m sure there is a better possible translation, and, if you can think of one, let me know.

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Posted in #WoodcutWednesday Tagged #WoodcutWednesday 3 Comments

#WoodcutWednesday test… But at least it has a cool pic.

20130404-154442.jpg

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Posted in #WoodcutWednesday

George Bartisch’s Ophthalmodouleia Das ist Augendienst (1583): Animating the Early Modern Eye

For the past few days, I have been working on a long essay on the anatomy of the eye and the importance of the crystalline humor in early modern elite and popular discourses on sight, but I took some time away from editing to play around with both Flash and a digital edition of George Bartish’s splendid 1583 work on the diseases of the eye, the Ophthalmodouleia Das ist Augendienst.

A full-text digital edition of Bartisch’s work with some very high quality scans can be found here courtesy of the Internet Archive.

While I had seen some of the images from the Opthalmodoulia before reproduced in secondary sources, I had never seen a copy of the complete text before today, and, consequently, was unaware that the text also contained a woodcut of ocular anatomy with moveable flaps. Since I have been messing around with Flash to produce a few short videos for #WoodcutWednesday, I decided to try my hand at animating Bartisch’s anatomy of the eye.

What follows are two different animations. The first, an interactive animation, requires a Flash player, and the second, a Youtube video, does not have any interactivity but can be played on any device. Enjoy!

Sorry, either Adobe flash is not installed or you do not have it enabled

I hope to have my work on the crystalline humor posted by early next week.

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Posted in Early Modern Senses, Shaping Sense, Tangents Tagged history of science, senses, vision, early modern, history of optics 1 Comment

Utopian Fantasy: Imagining the Form of an Online Scholarly Journal

As I have only been starting to blog in earnest for a few months, my experience doing so has given me occasion to reflect on the typical form of the journal article and scholarly publication. While many journals now have online editions or make their publications available through PDF versions, those online editions try to replicate the form of the print journal as closely as possible. One problem with this is that those forms, well suited for print, once applied to online versions, limit and obstruct the development of new forms of scholarly argument and critique.

It is probably inevitable that online journals will ultimately replace print journals altogether, but, in this interim period, I wonder if now isn’t the time to consider new forms of scholarly communication and publication. As people develop new wholly online scholarly journals, they often seem bound to the conventions of the format they intend to replace. I want to use this post as a way to speculate on some possibilities of form and format I have been imagining recently, and while I lack the time or the resources to put some of these imagined formats into practice, I hope to do so in the future. While I am limited for now to the restrictions on page editing on WordPress.com and by my own very limited coding skills, blogging some portions of my work on the Phantasy, the senses, the paramaterial, and skepticism, leads me to question the form I have been deploying within my posts.

So far, I have simply followed the conventions of print. I have used the MLA format for citation and have occasionally used ordinary endnotes. While one cannot really compare a blog to a journal, the experience has led to contemplating some of the practices of scholarly journals as well as their form. I have been imagining an online journal or scholarly publication platform that incorporates the freedom and non-linearity that less restrictive online forms might allow, breaking the conventions established by traditional print journals and books. Both the restrictions of WordPress.com and my own coding limitations render, for now, the impossibility of trying to create a form of scholarly article and process of publication I envision below. But, then again, this is a utopian fantasy and post anyway.

What follows is a list of features that I thought might be incorporated in a new format.

1) For all of our railing against the “stable text,” scholars often want and demand stable texts for scholarly publications. The idea of scholarly articles in print depends upon the idea that once peer-reviewed and codified, the article becomes a stable point of reference to which others can cite and refer. The problem here is that such articles contribute to an unrealistic idea of textual stability to which at least many literary scholars tend to theoretically object. What I’m imagining is an online journal or book that maintains a thorough history page so that one can track previous versions and note changes that have been made since the respondent referred to it. I could even imagine a scenario in which two articles that are speaking to and responding to one another can be integrated into one another through a series of hyperlinks or expandable menus. Such a format would allow for flexibility on both the part of the reader as well as upon the part of an author.

2) Footnotes, endnotes, and citations can be incorporated within the text as a type of expandable field within the body of the text itself. Some sites already use hovering to reveal the contents of a traditional style note, but I’m thinking of something much more developed here. Let’s say I’m writing about some topic but want to add a note that explains other scholars’ perspectives or offers a complicating factor that does not fit into the overall point of my topic. In this case, I could have the main text with an icon with something like “see more” within the body of my essay that expands to include the information and might be a point to link my later work or work from others on the same topic. When I ultimately switch to WordPress.org and have a broader range of coding skills, I intend to experiment with a citation and noting method based on the marginal glosses of early modern printed books. I hope to make a series of expandable glosses as well as pushing the citations to the margins of the block text and hyperlink them to online editions where possible.

3) By now, we all know the difficulty of citing websites and tracking down the content. When we do find references to online content, it is often difficult to find the passage or portion in question. This is part of the reason PDF files with specific page numbers are the best frame of reference at the moment. If all scholarly publications become virtual, I imagine that such methods of citation would become obsolete since one could theoretically link to the passage in question, in context, within the page itself to the edition cited. Another option would be to create a new standard of online reference points. As a way to create points of reference, we could return to the method of reference and citation found in translations of classical texts. Paragraphs and sections could be marked in the margins with a number system that would also allow for additions in the form of the expandable sections I mentioned in my second point. This method would allow for someone to find a particular passage in formats where hyperlinking is impossible (such as in print).

4) Because we are so used to the format of printed scholarly journals, we often find ourselves limited to a set number of pages that often means that some insightful points or tangents that might interest some readers but which must be truncated, cut, or buried in footnotes. Of course, such limitations are often useful. There are so many articles but very little time, and so the limitations of the traditional scholarly publication means that an author or authors must be concise and crop such extraneous limbs and outward flourishes. With the system I envision, however, one could have both short and long forms of the traditional essay. Instead of having a directly linear text of a set length, a system of expandable portions could allow a reader to follow an argument through a length most suited for their time and interests. Since I am playing a game of imaginary forms here, I could imagine a text which expands outwards from an abstract style block of text that could expand outward towards a full article length text.

5) Using the print format as the basis of design and format for online journals also creates limitations on the types of scholarly information and arguments we can present. Journals books and print mean that the form of our content must be limited to the verbal and the statically visual. This might be fine for traditional scholarly articles in general, but imagine a journal which incorporates video or interactive features within the body of its argument. For example, I can picture a film journal that allows a reader to watch the scene under discussion which could exist alongside a written description and transcript of the dialogue. Such a form would allow for the critic to show specific portions within the context of her argument. A second feature that I could see being useful is the integration of interactive demonstrations or presentations. In this, instead of having a static graph or visualization, one could include a way for the reader/ user to interact with the information the article provides. I am currently working, for example, on a Flash animated presentation that allows the user to guide themselves through a basic understanding of the sensitive soul in classical, medieval and early modern varieties. While Flash may be a platform marked for virtual death, I can imagine doing something similar with HTML5 that would allow a reader/user to interact with the data and information an article provides. You can see my test post here. One reason I have failed to finish this project is that the Flash format, limited as it is with respect to mobile and touch devices like the iPhone and iPad, will most likely soon be replaced by HTML5. While I only have a cursory understanding of Flash and Actionscript anyway, my knowledge of Javascript and HTML5 is virtually nonexistent. Something I hope to correct soon.

6) While collaborative publications are themselves not uncommon, the limitations of print present the illusion of complete unity between or among collaborating co-authors. I wonder if an online format that allowed multiple perspectives on a particular topic might help develop new areas of inquiry and challenge the way in which collaborate projects work. New formats might allow for collaborative projects that can occasionally challenge or open otherwise closed areas of debate and engagement.

7) The practice of peer-review. Here, I will probably enter my most controversial line of inquiry. From my perspective, there are two major flaws in the peer-review process. The first is practical and the second more theoretical. The first is that it often takes an inordinate amount of time for a scholarly work to move go from manuscript to publication. While it often assures a level of prestige and through this approval method, it also means that scholars must wait for months or sometimes years before the work they have done to appear in print. The notion of approval and prestige brings me to my second more theoretical objection. While in the humanities and social sciences, scholars tend towards challenging broader social and cultural hierarchies and top-down practices of society generally, academics often defend the rigid top-down structure and practices within academia itself. As I see it, the peer-review process is a top-down hierarchy based on prestige and power. Since I am playing a utopian game in this post, I want to sketch out one possible alternative method of peer-review that might be a more bottom-up method. My fantastical online journal or publishing house could have a system in place which creates two connected yet somewhat distinct databases of submissions. After a rigorous screening process, a scholar could first post a submission to the journal which would keep the submission within a “pending review” category which would still be publicly available. Other scholars could then access its content and, if they feel the work is a legitimate and meets some system of criteria for approval, they could then mark the submission as approved or could comment on what needs to be corrected or changed in order to meet their standards of approval. The journal could, once the submission reaches some level of broader approval, it could then become an official Journal “publication.” In this process, I would like to see complete transparency involved on the part of reviewers and reviews alike. The responses would be publicly available and readable alongside the submission under review. Such a system, though I am sure it has its flaws, would create a peer-review process that would allow readers to see the reader review process in action as well as to take issue with particular individual reviews or comments while making the article quickly available, searchable and citable.

8) Open-access. No paywall. If there is a paywall, then many of proceeds go to authors themselves and their institutions rather than to Elsevier, Springer and Wiley. To be honest, that is the type of paywall many universities and academics could get behind, and, considering the exorbitant fees siphoned by the publishing companies. Imagine if paywall fees were commensurate with what scholars are paid for the publication of their work. Such a paywall might be acceptable.

With that, so ends my game of journal utopian fantasy.

N.B. Since writing this entry, Scott Selisker has informed me about the existence of the online blog Vector which already incorporates some of my imagined scenarios into its form and structure. I have yet to explore the content more thoroughly, but it appears to include non-static visual demonstrations and animations nestled within its textual matter. I look forward to checking out the format and find its very existence encouraging.

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Posted in Sense of Myself, Fantasies, Tangents Tagged digital humanities, Scholarly publication
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